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ABSTRACT 
Extensive research has been conducted in a variety of countries investigating 
the extent of underpricing of initially listed companies. In addition, various 
studies have been conducted in an attempt to try and establish the 
relationship between disclosure and underpricing. Underpricing remains a 
vexing issue that continues to stimulate rigorous debate within economic and 
accounting research. This study seeks to remedy the omission of recent 
South African research on this subject. 
The study looks to establish whether underpricing has occurred on the 
Alternative Exchange of South Africa, (AltX). The AltX was launched on 27 
October 2003, as the junior exchange to the larger Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). 
The study follows the methodology of a previous South African study, by 
Barlow and Sparks (1986), which looked at the underpricing of shares on the 
JSE between the periods 1972 to 1986. This study looks at establishing 
underpricing on the AltX, during the periods October 2003 to March 2007. 
The findings of the study showed that underpricing was evident on the AltX 
during the period of review, with the average recorded underpricing being 
33.21%. 
Research is also conducted to investigate the relationship between disclosure 
and underpricing, with specific focus on the use of proceeds disclosures 
within the listing prospectus of a firm. The primary aim of the research, in this 
regard, was to establish the validity of posited theory that increased disclosure 
by firms should be associated with reduced underpricing. 
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During the period of review [October 2003 - March 2007], 41 firms listed on 
the AltX, therefore rendering a limited universe of firms to draw a sample to 
investigate the relationship between disclosure and underpricing. 
The study draws on the methodology of Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006) 
and investigates the relationship between use of proceeds disclosure and 
underpricing. This relationship was tested statistically using a simple linear 
regression, as well as using forward stepwise regression techniques. 
The results of the test of the relationship between use of proceeds disclosure 
and underpricing were not statistically significant. The method of drafting the 
prospectuses of the majority of firms may have had a significant impact on the 
extent of detail provided by companies within prospectuses. 
Further analysis was undertaken to study the relationship of selected 
variables such as firm size, book to market ratios and ownership retention to 
the level of underpricing. 
The results of the tests found that the relationship between the level of 
underpricing and any of the selected variables was not significantly significant. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Aims 
The issue of underpricing of new issuances has been the subject of a number 
of theoretical and empirical research papers. Early writers, notably Logue 
(1973) and Ibbotson (1975) document the underpricing of newly issued 
common stock. Ibbotson focused on the period 1960 to 1969, with the 
objective of proving initial average positive returns for registered new 
issuances on the (US) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Within 
this period, Ibbotson recorded that the average initial performance is positive 
[11.4%], indicating that new issue offerings are underpriced. 
For the purposes of this research, the definition of underpricing as proposed 
by Ljungqvist is used. Specifically; this is presented by the percentage 
difference between the price at which the Initial Public Offering (IPO) shares 
were sold to investors, [the offer price], and the price at which the shares 
subsequently trade in the market. Ljungqvist (2006) The period of 
measurement of underpricing is limited to the end of the first day of trading. 
There have been a number of empirical papers written on the subject of 
underpricing subsequent to Ibbotson's research; documenting the 
underpricing of new issuances in the United States, Europe as well as Asian 
IPO markets. Suffice to contend that empirical IPO literature on underpricing 
is advanced within the above-mentioned developed markets. 
In contrast, there has been limited research conducted on this subject within 
South Africa. Research that specifically investigates the underpricing of new 
issuances on the Alternative Exchange of South Africa [the Altx] will expand 
current South African literature on underpricing of newly issued shares. The 
absence of recent research on underpricing specifically focussed on the Altx, 
motivates the primary research objective of this dissertation. 
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The primary objective of this research endeavour is to investigate and 
establish whether new listings to the AltX were underpriced. The time-period 
for this investigation is 27 October 2003 to 31 March 2007. The AltX was 
launched on 27 October 2003; this therefore provides a period of analysis of 
over three years. 
The secondary objective of this research endeavor is to examine the assertion 
made within disclosure theory, which implies that firms benefit from increased 
disclosure. The specific benefit being analyzed is reduced underpricing. As 
proposed by Schrand and Verrecchia, underpricing can be viewed as a proxy 
for the cost of capital for issuing firms. Disclosure theory, therefore forwards 
the notion that with increased disclosure firms can actually reduce the cost of 
capital, by reducing the extent of underpricing Schrand and Verrecchia 
(2004). 
This study adopts the approach of researchers Leone, Rock and Willenborg 
(2006) in defining disclosure as only being the specific reference of the use of 
IPO proceeds within the prospectus. 
Within an IPO setting, it is assumed that there is limited public historical 
information regarding the firm or its management. It is also assumed that 
management possesses superior information with regards to the performance 
of the firm and its future prospects. These and other important factors lead to 
a high degree of valuation uncertainty of the firm looking to list for the first 
time. 
Relative to investors, managers of a firm have superior information about the 
firm. This difference in information between the two parties is called 
information asymmetry. The differing level of information between managers 
and investors also makes it difficult for investors to value the firm 
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The research will specifically look at investigating whether the disclosure 
within the listing prospectus published by firms looking to list on the AltX has a 
measurable and observable impact on the level of underpricing experienced 
at the time of listing. This study will attempt to establish whether it is 
observable that for those firms where reduced underpricing is recorded, that 
these firms will also have employed more effective disclosure policies. In 
contrast, for those firms where greater underpricing is recorded, it will be 
observed that these firms will have employed inferior disclosure mechanisms 
within their prospectus. The measure of effective disclosure is observed in the 
extent to which firms specify the use of proceeds. 
11 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1.2 Why Was The Research Carried Out? 
1.2.1 The AltX 
This research endeavour is motivated by the absence of contemporary 
empirical research output related to underpricing of shares listed on the AltX. 
The AltX will have been in existence for over three years by 31 March 2007, 
with 41 recorded listings as at 31 March 2007. The AltX was formed to allow 
for the smaller companies not yet able to list on the JSE, access to a wider 
pool of investment capital for the development of their business. In addition to 
this, the AltX also aims to facilitate and promote Black Economic 
Empowerment in South Africa. The primary role of the AltX is to provide a fair 
and efficient market for the trading securities. 
Documenting the first day performance of a newly listed share, can serve as 
an indication of the efficiency of the market evidenced by the level at which 
the market values the firm, based on the latest available information. 
It is proposed that through employing more effective disclosures within the 
official listing prospectus, firms can ensure more effective dissemination of 
information within the market. 
Market efficiency can be described in terms of how share prices react to new 
information. This implies that share prices are affected by information 
disclosure, therefore signifying the importance of information disclosure on the 
capital market Strom (2006). 
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1.2.2 Research on the underpricing phenomenon within South Africa 
Underpricing is a phenomenon that has received extensive research coverage 
in developed financial markets, of North America and Europe. Early papers on 
the subject from writers, Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), document that 
when companies go public, the shares they sell tend to be underpriced. The 
authors document that the share price jumps substantially on the first day of 
trading. There is limited recent research on this phenomenon within South 
Africa. 
Barlow and Sparks (1986) found a mean first day return of 32.1 % during the 
period 1972 to 1986, for IPO's listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). Page and Reyneke (1997) documented the long-run performance for a 
sample of 118 South African initial public offerings listed on the JSE between 
January 1980 and December 1991. 
International research on underpricing within emerging markets is available, 
although not to the same extent as research available on developed markets. 
Kiymaz (1999), records underpricing of Turkish IPO's; Lee et a!. (1996b) 
investigate IPO's in Singapore; Kazantzis and Levis (1995) in Greece; Kim et 
a!. (1995) in Korea, Aggarwal et a!. (1993) in Chile, Mexico and Brazil; and 
Dawson (1987) in Hong-Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. These studies all 
report the existence of initial underpricing of shares within each respective 
market. 
During the period October 2003 to March 2007, 41 companies have listed 
their shares on the AltX for the first time. The writer is unaware of recent 
studies that document the level of underpricing (if any) has occurred for firms 
listing on the AltX. This research will look to expand on the international 
literature available on underpricing within emerging markets, with a particular 
focus on the AltX. 
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As more companies list on the AltX it is important for empirical research to be 
formulated to record the initial performance of IPO's, as well as document 
whether new listings on the AltX are underpriced as is the case in other 
researched global markets. 
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1.3 What are the Research Questions? 
Based on the research conducted by Ibbotson on the risk and performance 
(measured by risk-adjusted returns) on newly issued common stocks which 
were offered to the public for the first time during the period 1960 through 
1969, Ibbotson found on average, an 11.4% discount to the offer price. The 
conclusion to the study was such that new issue offerings within that specific 
period of review were underpriced Ibbotson, (1975: 1). 
The first question that we will seek to answer is: 
"Were unseasoned equity offerings on the AltX during the period 27 October 
2003 to 31 March 2007, underpriced?" 
The first hypothesis is that new issue offerings on the AltX were not 
underpriced during the period of review of 27 October 2003 to 31 March 2007. 
The second question that this research seeks to answer is whether it can be 
inferred that through effective disclosure employed within the prospectus; with 
specific reference to use of proceeds, results in reduced underpricing of 
issued shares for companies listing on the AltX. 
The second hypothesis is that it cannot be inferred that through use of 
effective disclosure within the prospectus of firms that listed on the AltX, the 
extent of underpricing is reduced. 
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1.4 Why Disclosure Mechanisms within the 
Prospectus? 
DISCLOSURE MECHANISMS 
As proposed by earlier researchers like Verrecchia (2001), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), this research will look to investigate whether information 
disclosure mitigates the information asymmetry between management of the 
firm and investors. The difference in information between the two parties is 
called information asymmetry. It is proposed that through use of disclosure 
mechanisms within the prospectus, firms can decrease information 
asymmetry, and in turn, reduce the level extent of underpricing. 
Information asymmetry models are evidenced through the research 
conducted by Rock (1986). Rock posits within a modelled IPO environment, 
there is a group of informed investors whose information is superior to 
uninformed investors. With newly issued stocks, informed investors' crowd out 
uninformed investors when good issues (underpriced issues) are offered and 
they withdraw from the market when bad issues (overpriced) are offered. 
Because the informed investors only apply for what they view to be 
underpriced stock, this results in oversubscription of the issue and a lesser 
allocation to the uninformed investor. The uninformed investor inevitably ends 
up with a disproportionately large amount of overpriced issues and fewer 
underpriced issues. Rock refers to this phenomenon as the "winner's curse 
problem", which is an extension to the "Lemon's problem" as highlighted by 
Akerlof (1990). In order to resolve the "winner's curse problem", the issuing 
firm must price the shares at a discount in order to guarantee that the 
uniformed investors purchase the issue. 
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Empirical studies have shown that underpricing is associated with various 
costly communications devices, such as underwriter and auditor quality and 
managerial retained ownership Verrecchia and Schrand (2005). A study 
conducted by Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2003), records a relationship 
between underpricing and the specificity of the prospectus discussion about 
the intended use of the I PO proceeds. 
However, rather little is known, of what types of information are important 
within a prospectus, that in their inclusion, listing firms experience reduced 
underpricing, whilst in their absence, greater underpricing is recorded. 
The research objective is therefore premised on the assumption that due to 
limited analyst coverage of such firms looking to list on the Alternative 
Exchange of South Africa, these firms are more likely to use their prospectus 
as an important communication mechanism to influence market perceptions. 
The extent of disclosures utilised within the prospectus will determine the 
effectiveness of the prospectus in influencing market perceptions; this will be 
evidenced in the extent of underpricing of that particular issuance. 
It is acknowledged that drawing a causal link between disclosure mechanisms 
and underpricing is difficult and it is unlikely that a definitive causal result can 
be established with regards to disclosure and price change. However, this 
research endeavour will attempt to offer a logical framework from which it is 
possible to observe the effectiveness of a disclosure mechanism utilised by 
firm within its prospectus, when listing on the AltX. 
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1.5 Research Limitations 
The report examines the various aspects of the pricing of new equity issues 
on the AltX, as well as investigates the level of disclosure within the 
prospectus of each listing firm. The report focuses on establishing whether 
firms that listed on the AltX experienced underpricing during the period 27 
October 2003 to 31 March 2007. This study also aims to establish whether 
specificity as a measure of disclosure plays a significant role in reducing 
information asymmetry, evidenced through reduced underpricing. 
This research will review specific international theoretical and empirical 
studies as well as contemporary local research on underpricing of newly 
issued shares. The research will differ from the majority of empirical studies in 
terms of using the prospectus as the primary source of disclosure information, 
as opposed to annual financial reports. 
Certain parameters were employed, to ensure that only variables relevant to 
this report were included: 
• Only the issuance of ordinary shares was considered in underpricing 
research and disclosure research; 
• Only new listings were taken into consideration. The definition of new 
listings excludes companies that migrated from the [Development 
Capital Market] DCM and [Venture Capital Market] VCM boards of the 
JSE, within the period of review; 
• Reverse takeovers and cash shells methods of listing were not 
included within the research; introductions where there is no issue or 
sale of shares were also not included within this study; 
• Other forms of announcements of communication by the firm, such as 
newspapers inserts, media briefings or road shows, were not included 
as part of disclosure, the prospectus, was taken to be primary 
document of information. 
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There are many aspects to underpricing and disclosure research, however, 
this report restricts itself to considering aspects of underpricing and the 
contents of the prospectus. 
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1.6 Background and Historical Overview 
This chapter provides a brief background to the Alternative Exchange of 
South Africa (AltX) , the parallel exchange, to the larger Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE); reasons for and methods of listing; the listing requirements 
and costs of a listing on the AltX. 
1.6.1 History of the Altx 
Forerunners to the AltX were the Development Capital Market and the 
Venture Capital Market (launched in 1984) of the JSE. These boards were 
launched with the intention of meeting the needs of less mature companies 
which were unable to qualify for a listing on the main board. The Development 
Capital and Venture Capital boards were largely unsuccessful in meeting their 
envisaged objectives. Critical failures to these boards were their inability to 
attract quality companies and investors. The AltX is envisaged to be a 
superior and suitable replacement to these failed bourses. 
The AltX is a division of the JSE, and was launched in October 2003. It was 
formed on the basis that it would represent a "parallel exchange" because it 
operates alongside the Main Board, [the JSE], but targets small and medium 
growing companies Magliolo (2004). 
The objective of the AltX is to provide high quality migratory platform to the 
main board of the JSE. 
The AltX performs essentially two roles. 
I. It provides a capital market for small, medium and start-up companies, 
whereby these companies can raise capital. 
II. It also provides a secondary market whereby the securities of these 
companies can be traded. 
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The AltX was modelled of the successful Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 
the London Stock Exchange's global market for smaller, growing companies 
Magliolo (2004). AIM was launched in 1995, and has admitted over 1200 
companies to the exchange and has assisted companies to raise over US$14 
Billion whilst listed on AIM. 
Since its inception three years ago, the AltX has successfully listed over 30 
companies, with a number of companies with plans to list in the immediate 
near future. The total capital raised from listing by the firms included within 
this study was over ZAR1 Billion. The current market capitalization of the AltX 
is ZAR5 Billion. (AltX Media Release, October 2005) 
1.6.2 Reasons for listing shares 
Listed below is an overview of the main reasons provided by firms in the 
listing prospectuses reviewed. 
I. Raising of capital 
The issuance of shares through listing enables the company to access 
a much wider pool of capital that it otherwise would not have been able 
to, had it remained unlisted. Listing also enables the firm to access 
funding at a later stage from the capital market with relative ease, 
either through rights issues, or further public offerings. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
II. Unlocking of wealth 
Listing affords the existing shareholders an efficient means of realising 
their wealth. The existing shareholders have the option to sell a 
proportion of the shares either at the time of initially listing or at a later 
stage to the open market. Listing on the AltX also affords venture 
capitalists, angel investors or minority shareholders, the opportunity to 
sell their stake in the company with greater ease, than if they were to 
try sell their holding in an unlisted company. 
III. Elevating the image of the company 
Throughout the listing process and thereafter, the image of the 
company is can be improved within the following areas: media profile, 
employee/personnel profile and financing profile. 
In the process leading up to the IPO and the period thereafter, the 
company receives an increased amount of media coverage, particularly 
within the financial press. The elevated media profile raises awareness 
of the company and its future prospects, which can lead to further 
interest from potential investors. 
Employee recruitment and motivation can be enhanced by elevating 
the company from being an unlisted company, to one that is listed. 
Listing will also provide the opportunity to the company to introduce 
employee share schemes, which are attractive incentives for 
employee's long-term objectives. 
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Heightened awareness of the company can be beneficial in terms of 
increased liquidity, due to greater interest in the firm. The company can 
also receive better terms from suppliers and provide better goods and 
service to customers as a result of become a listed entity. 
Listing on the AltX provides the additional benefit to investors in that the AltX 
listing requirements place great emphasis not just on initial, but ongoing 
disclosure of company information. There is also a focus on the enhancement 
of the skills of directors on AltX companies, thus ensuring adherence to good 
corporate governance and reporting by companies, where very little historical 
information is available to investors. 
1.6.3 Methods of listing on the AltX 
Public Offer 
An offer to the public may be an offer for subscription or an offer for sale. 
In an offer for subscription, members of the public are invited to subscribe for 
un-issued shares and the proceeds accrue to the company. In an offer for 
sale, existing shareholders invite subscribers to purchase their shares and 
therefore the proceeds accrue to the sellers. This method requires the 
publication of a prospectus, which must be approved by and registered with 
the Registrar of Companies and the Companies Act of 1973. 
Private Placing 
A private placing is an offer of shares to selected parties where shares are 
"placed" or offered to subscribers by the company as the result of private 
negotiations. 
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A private placing with an institution may help to ensure a stable, long term 
shareholding in the company and can facilitate the raising of funds in the 
event that the company wishes to raise additional capital in the future by way 
of a rights offer. This method is most widely used by firms looking to list on the 
AltX. 
A Combination of private placing and public offer 
This is often the most suitable method, and is the most widely used vehicle 
used by firms looking to list in the AltX. This hybrid issuing method ensures 
that the firm derives the benefits of both methods. 
Cash Shell 
A listed cash shell company acquires a viable business, either for cash, or for 
the issue of additional shares in the cash shell company. A cash shell is a 
listed company whose assets consist wholly or mostly of cash or shares 
because it has disposed of all, or a substantial part of its business. 
Reverse Takeover 
A listed company acquires a larger but unlisted company or business. This 
results in a change of control of the shareholding of the listed company, and 
also requires the publication of a transmuted listing statement. 
In a reverse takeover a compatible listed company will acquire the unlisted 
company with the purchase consideration being paid by the issue of new 
shares in the listed company. These new shares must be sufficient in number 
and value to ensure that the shareholders in question have a controlling 
interest in the listed company after the issue of new shares. 
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An Introduction 
An introduction is suitable where a company does not need to raise capital 
and has an existing wide spread of shareholders. In order to list on the AltX, a 
pre-listing statement is required that contains salient information about the 
company 
An introduction does not involve the issue or sale of shares and therefore 
does not fall within the scope of this research endeavour. 
The cash shell and reverse take-over methods involve using existing listed 
companies as a means for obtaining listing, these methods fall outside the 
scope of this research endeavour are therefore not discussed further within 
the submission Magliolo (2004). 
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1.7 Overview of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this study unfolds as follows: 
Chapter 2 is the literature review section of the thesis and is structured in two 
sections. The first section introduces the background the various theories that 
have been forwarded on the subject of underpricing. This first section 
presents an analysis of the various theories and draws on the findings 
relevant empirical studies that have been conducted to test the validity of 
certain theories of underpricing. 
The second section of Chapter 2, presents theories related to disclosure, with 
specific focus on theories forwarded on disclosure and the relationship to 
underpricing. Chapter 2 is concluded with a summary of significant empirical 
studies which look to tests the validity of disclosure proxies having an effect 
on the underpricing. 
Chapter 3 reviews the methodology employed within the present study, to test 
for underpricing on the AltX, as well as to test the relationship between use of 
proceeds disclosure and underpricing. The methodology employed for testing 
for underpricing draws on certain techniques employed by Barlow and Sparks 
(1986). The present study also draws on methodologies detailed by Leone, 
Rock and Willenborg (2006), utilised to test if there is a significant relationship 
between uses of proceeds disclosure and underpricing, for AltX listed firms. 
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the statistical analyses 
performed. The results are integrated with international research findings, with 
relevant commentary on the key points of features that differentiate the 
observed results of this South African study, to international findings. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 conclusions are drawn and areas of future research work 
are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Within the research reviewed on the underpricing of initially listed shares in 
both developed and developing countries; various theories have been 
forwarded in an attempt to provide rationale for this phenomenon. 
The literature review will be structured into two parts. The first section will 
focus on theoretical and empirical literature on underpricing, the stated 
primary research objective of the thesis. The overview of existing empirical 
literature on underpricing, will allow for an understanding of how the primary 
research objective of this dissertation was derived. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaustively probe each theory relating 
to underpricing; the main emphasis will be on literature which is premised on 
the asymmetric information model. The asymmetric information models 
assumes that one party knows more than the other party, and as a result of 
this difference, underpricing occurs. 
The second part of the literature review will focus on disclosure research, with 
specific reference to research and literature findings related to the topic of 
information asymmetry. Of particular interest to this research endeavour, is 
the proposed relationship between disclosure and information asymmetry, 
where a number of researchers test the assertion that increased disclosure 
results in reduced information asymmetry, evidenced through reduced 
underpricing at the time of listing. 
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2.2 Underpricing 
Introduction 
This section of the literature review will analyse and discuss key theories and 
empirical tests that fall under asymmetric information model. This model is 
premised on one party possessing more information than others, and thus the 
resulting information frictions give rise to underpricing in equilibrium 
Ljungqvist, (2006). 
This study will look at those companies that have listed on the AltX, junior 
bourse to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The study will look to 
analyze the level of underpricing experienced on the day of listing of each 
company. The AltX celebrated more than three years of existence by March 
2007, with over forty listings up to that date. 
Contemporary financial research on underpricing continues to support the 
early empirical findings, notably Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). These 
researchers noted; when companies go public the shares they sell tend to be 
underpriced. Loughran and Ritter (1994) document international evidence of 
underpricing, reviewing 39 countries. Since the 1960's, underpricing in the 
United States alone has averaged 19%. 
Thus, international research gives credence to the assertion that underpricing 
remains an important research topic for better understanding of capital market 
dynamics, particularly at the time of listing. 
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Defining Underpricing 
Where underpricing occurs, companies received less money for the shares of 
stock than the market perceived price Brennan (1996). 
In the majority of empirical research papers reviewed, authors calculated the 
amount of underpricing or initial return as the return from the offer price to the 
closing price on the first day of trading, expressed as a percentage. 
An alternative to calculating the initial return as a percentage is by measuring 
the extent of underpricing by means of monetary value. This is measured as 
the difference between the closing price and the offer price, multiplied by the 
number of shares sold at the IPO. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Review of Underpricing - Asymmetric Information 
Model 
2.2.1.1 The Winner's Curse 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EM H), this hypothesis states 
that a market is efficient if prices always fully reflect all available information 
Fama (1970). Within the setting of an Initial Public Offering, the prices of new 
shares on offer to investors are not set by the interaction of demand and 
supply, as suggested by the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
Within an inefficient market, the informed investors are therefore in a superior 
position to uninformed investors. Informed investors can therefore profit from 
their knowledge advantage, by bidding for underpriced shares. The informed 
investor will not bid for overpriced shares or the issuances of companies that 
he perceives as lesser quality, given the benefit of this superior knowledge. In 
instances where shares are either overpriced or are poor quality shares, 
informed investors withdraw from the market. 
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On the other hand, uninformed investors are assumed to bid equal amounts 
for all shares issued. Uninformed investors possess lesser knowledge with 
regards to the correct valuation and assessment of the quality of firms, as 
they have not taken the time nor expense to become more informed. Thus, a 
scenario arises where, due to their superior knowledge, informed investors 
will place large orders on those shares identified to have been issued at a 
discount to fair value. 
It is assumed that shares are allocated to subscribers on some systematic 
basis. Informed investors "crowd out" uninformed investors, thus uninformed 
investors receive few of the underpriced shares. However, uninformed 
investors will receive a disproportionate amount (if not all) of the overpriced 
shares, [as informed investors have withdrawn from the market]. 
Ritter (1984) cites the above phenomenon as a plausible rationale as to why 
underpricing occurs, calling it the "winner's curse". Uninformed investors 
receive a disproportionately high allocation of issues that are overpriced in 
comparison with those that are underpriced Ritter (1984a:220). 
2.2.1.2 Issuing Shares at a Discount in order to attract uninformed 
investors to the market 
Rock (1986) advanced the theory of the "winner's curse", by proposing that an 
issuer should price shares at a discount in order to attract uninformed 
investors to the offering. This discount can be viewed as incentive or 
compensation for uninformed investors for receiving a disproportionate 
number of overpriced shares - evidence of the winner's curse. 
Within this model, the allocation of the shares is not based on market forces 
of demand and supply and therefore adjusting the share price until the market 
clears, but rather on quantity - allocation. It is due to this institutional feature, 
that adverse selection arises (Ritter, 1984). 
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Therefore, underpricing of shares can be viewed as a correction to the 
inefficient allocation of share issuance, by compensating uninformed investors 
for an over allocation of overpriced shares. It is posited that should this not 
occur, the uninformed investor will choose not to participate in the market for 
initial public offerings until the price falls to such an level [on average] in order 
to compensate him for the allocation bias. 
This theory also implies that underpricing of shares [on average] is also 
compensation to those investors who do become informed, for the costs of 
becoming informed. Ritter proposes that the greater the fundamental 
uncertainty about the issue, the greater is the required compensation to 
investors for becoming informed Ritter (1984). This implies that firms that are 
considered to be of higher risk, in terms of the difficulty in valuing these firms, 
the greater research required to become informed. Following from this line of 
reasoning, firms that are more difficult to value and understand should be 
underpriced more than firms which are simpler to understand and value. 
In summation, Rock concludes this theory for why underpricing occurs as 
being a consequence of a model that incorporates asymmetric information 
and quantity rationing (Rock, 1986). 
2.2.1.3 Ex - ante uncertainty and underpricing 
Beaty and Ritter (1986) posit that as ex ante uncertainty increases about the 
value of shares, so too does the expected underpricing demanded by 
investors. This scenario is particular to an initial public offering where the 
issuing firm will not have an established market valuation for its stock. 
In addition to this, as uncertainty increases, the winner's curse problem is 
further intensified and as a consequence; uninformed investors will demand 
that more money be "left on the table", in an expected value sense, via 
underpricing. 
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Beaty and Ritter (1986) tested this hypothesis empirically and found that a 
relationship does exist between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing. 
However, the authors did stress that ex ante uncertainty that leads to 
underpricing does not correspond to systematic risk in the CAPM. An investor 
who diversifies his risk by subscribing for many different unseasoned issues 
will realise a lower than average return due to the winner's curse. 
A key finding in relation to ex ante uncertainty drawn by the authors is such 
that because of the positive relationship between underpricing and 
uncertainty, voluntary disclosure of information is found to reduce uncertainty, 
which is beneficial to the issuer. 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) generalize the notion that issuers have an 
incentive to reduce underpricing. The authors argue if issuers can take costly 
actions that reduce underpricing, they will do so up to the point where the 
marginal cost of reducing underpricing further just equals the marginal benefit. 
This marginal benefit is not measured by underpricing itself, but by the 
reduction in the issuer's wealth loss that underpricing implies. 
2.2.1.4 Underwriters and Underpricing 
A theory posited by Beaty and Ritter (1986), proposes that underwriters play 
an important role in enforcing an underpricing equilibrium. Because 
companies looking to list are looking to maximize the proceeds from listing, 
they do not have an incentive to underprice. In contrast, in order to attract 
investors to the unseasoned issues market, such issues on average need to 
be underpriced. 
Beaty and Ritter (1986) propose that in order to enforce the equilibrium 
relationship between the motives of investor and issuer within an unseasoned 
equity market, there should be an intermediary who has an incentive to 
appropriately price issues. 
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This role is fulfilled by investment bankers, [in South Africa, on the AltX - a 
Designated Advisor]. In theory, it is proposed that through repeat business, 
the Investment Banker can develop and earn a return on his reputation. 
According to the above writers, in order for the Investment Banker to have an 
interest in enforcing the underpricing equilibrium, there are three necessary 
conditions: 
1. The Investment Banker must be uncertain of what the market price of 
the share will be, once it starts trading. 
2. The Investment Banker has non-salvagable reputation capital at stake, 
on which it can earn a return. 
3. The ability to earn a return on its reputation capital is eroded if the 
Investment Banker "cheats" by underpricing too much or too little. 
The second and third conditions are summarized by the following conclusion 
arrived at by Beaty and Ritter (1986:217): 
"future quasi - rents that a reputable investment banker can expect to earn exceeds 
the short-run gain from opportunistic behaviour. This willingness to not behave 
opportunistically is what is meant, we feel, by having a good reputation. An 
investment banker will find that it is not in its interest to behave opportunistically if it 
has a stock of reputation capital (goodwill) built-up, on which it is earning a return in 
the form of (for example) having lower distributi.on costs, or being able to charge 
higher underwriting fees" 
An empirical study conducted by Dunbar (2000), found that banks 
subsequently lose IPO market share if they either underprice or overprice too 
much, supporting the above claim made by Beaty and Ritter (1986). 
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This section concludes an overview of the main theories forwarded as 
reasons for the occurrence of underpricing within an IPO setting. The section 
which follows provides insights into other underpricing theories, which do not 
specifically fall under the information asymmetric model. These are discussed 
in some detail below. 
2.2.2 Theoretical Review of Underpricing - Other Theories 
2.2.2.1 Underpricing of unseasoned issues as a liquidity 
concession 
In a paper written by Logue (1973), the researcher posits that underpricing is 
necessary to induce investors to switch or change the composition of their 
current portfolio holdings, to also include newly issued shares. In order to 
attract investors to switch their portfolios and invest in new issues, a price 
concession is provided. The prospective investor compares the merits of the 
offered shares and the merits of seasoned shares in terms of earnings, 
growth prospects, risk etc. 
The author cites the necessity of a liquidity concession in order to: 
Move a large number of shares within a short period of time; 
Reduce exposure to the risk of adverse market movement; 
Obviate the need for extensive investor search, for holding shares for 
extended periods, and for engaging in costly post-listing price 
stabilisation activities. 
It is questionable whether the reasoning provided above regarding liquidity 
concessions, would sufficiently justify the widespread documentation of 
substantial underpricing, in a number of world markets, including the United 
States. Research conducted by Scholes (1972) showed that the price 
concessions necessary to move large blocks of shares quickly within the US 
market of seasoned issues, averaged two percent. This average is 
substantially less that the average underpricing experienced within the United 
States of 19%. 
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2.2.2.2 Institutional Lag Hypothesis 
This hypothesis posits that if the offering price was set at an early stage of the 
listing process, and the market rose before the first day of listing on the stock 
exchange, underpricing would result. Such periods have been referred to as 
"hot issue" periods, by Ritter (1984). Ritter tested this hypothesis by 
regressing initial returns on changes in the Natural Resources Index (NRI). 
Ritter provides as motivation for analysing specific initial public offerings of 
natural resource shares, that changing risk composition failed to explain high 
average initial returns during a hot issue period. Instead, high average initial 
returns were attributed predominantly to one particular industry sector, natural 
resource issues. Ritter (1984) found that the institutional lag hypothesis failed 
to explain the hot issue market. In addition to this, the underpricing 
phenomenon has also been observed in "cold issue" periods which suggest 
that the institutional lag hypothesis is not the main reason for underpricing. 
2.2.2.3 The Speculative Bubble Hypothesis 
Speculative investors tend to drive the price up on the first day of trading in an 
attempt to acquire the stock which they were unsuccessful in acquiring 
because of over-subscription and the quantity-rationing of the stock. This 
speculation in the after-market temporarily pushes the price of the stock 
above its intrinsic value. This theory, posits that there should also be periods 
of sharp price drops in the after-market (when the bubble bursts). Ritter 
(1984) examined average aftermarket returns for unseasoned issues and NRI 
returns respectively for various holding periods between January 1980 and 
August 1982, but could find no evidence of any bubble bursting. The 
speculative bubble hypothesis was therefore rejected. 
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2.2.2.4 Monopsony Power Hypothesis 
This hypothesis implies that underwriters underprice issues so that they can 
earn a profit by allocating these issues to favoured customers Ritter 
(1984:232). The implication of this action is that Investment Bankers 
intentionally underprice the issue and thus ration the issue to their larger 
clients who would regularly purchase other investment banking services from 
the Investment Bank. 
Evidence in support of this hypothesis is not widespread; monopsony power is 
likely to be witnessed in small segmented markets, where investment banking 
competition is limited and thus issuers are limited in their selection choices, of 
investment banker. Ritter (1984) corroborates this viewpoint in his study 
where he examined the price level of natural resource issues in relation to 
book values and the level of the Natural Resources Index (NRI), over three 
periods. Although underwriters appeared to underprice the natural resource 
companies during the hot issue market of 1980, Ritter notes that this was due 
to a segmented market where: 
"natural resource issues, especially small natural resource issues, were at the 
mercy of exploitive underwriters and other issuers were not. Such a situation 
is inherently unstable, and so it is not surprising that it did not last" Ritter 
(1984:239). 
2.2.2.5 Law-suit avoidance 
Ibbotson (1975) suggested that IPO's may be underpriced so that the issuing 
company is less exposed to legal liability arising from possible misleading or 
incomplete information in the prospectus. However, in rebuttal to this 
hypothesis, it can be proven that listing requirements and the compilation of 
prospectus information are invariably comprehensive, and therefore it is 
unlikely that law-suit avoidance mounts a credible explanation for 
underpricing. 
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2.2.2.6 Insurance hypothesis 
According to this hypothesis, underpricing represents the risk premium 
investors demand because the lack of performance history of the initial public 
offering increases the uncertainty about the future performance. Given this 
inherent risk, the issuing company fears that it may not list successfully if the 
offer price is pitched at what is perceived to be an excessive price considering 
the largely unknown track-record of the company. An alternative explanation 
is that the issuing company intentionally underpricing at initial issuance, in 
knowledge that the company will return to equity markets for second and third 
rounds of funding. Underpricing is therefore used as a strategy to induce 
investors to continue to purchase the company's shares in later rounds of 
funding. 
2.2.2.7 Risk-averse underwriter hypothesis 
This hypothesis is an extension of the insurance hypothesis, in that 
investment bankers may have difficulty in valuing the stock and their 
reputation could be put at risk if the listing is considered to be unsuccessful. 
The notion that underpricing serves as an insurance against damage to the 
reputation of investment bankers is forwarded by Tinic (1998:789). However, 
this argument remains unconvincing as a reason for underpricing, due to the 
fact that issuers would tend to look at securing the services of more 
experienced investment banks, where empirical evidence shows that 
underpricing is lower for more experienced or prestigious investment bankers. 
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2.3 Review of Empirical Research on Underpricing 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews major empirical studies on underpricing of new share 
issuance with, specific focus on empirical studies that have tested the various 
theories proposed in the previous section. This review will also include the 
results of research conducted to ascertain the extent of underpricing recorded 
within the South African market (prior studies have been based on the JSE) 
and other global equity markets. 
2.3.1 Empirical studies on underpricing of IPO's 
The United States IPO market is possibly the most studied market, with 
regards to IPO research and underpricing. Ibbotson and Jaffe studied all initial 
public offerings within the United States from 1960 to 1970 (Ibbotson and 
Jaffe, 1975). This study is considered a milestone research endeavour for 
both American and global advancement of IPO research. The study was the 
first comprehensive and long-period research endeavour within IPO research. 
The data sample consisted of 2883 issues (Ibbotson and Jaffe,1975). 
The researchers measured the initial return as the excess by which the 
difference between the issue price and the market price [at the end of the first 
calendar month of trading] exceeded the return on the market during the 
same period. The proxy used for the market was the Standard and Poor 500 
index. 
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The results of this study found that the average underpricing of the initial 
public offerings was 16.8%. Several studies have been conducted in other 
markets around the globe; the general consensus from such studies has 
shown that underpricing is similarly experienced in other markets. Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (2006), discuss evidence of underpricing of issuances in 
many countries world-wide. 
A review of research which tests the implications and empirical evidence of 
the theories previously mentioned shall follow. 
2.3.2 Empirical research on the Winner's Curse Theory 
A paper by Koh and Walter (1989) directly tests the Winner's Curse theory 
with the intent of assessing the extent to which shares are rationed on the 
offer date. The authors were looking to test whether the Winner's Curse 
model is correct in predicting that weighting the returns by the probability of 
receiving an allocation, the uninformed investor should earn the riskless rate. 
This study found that the rate of return is taken to be just enough to ensure 
the uninformed investors' continued participation in the market. 
The Singapore capital market was selected as the institutional setting for this 
research on unseasoned equity offerings; a key feature of this market is that 
the basis used for rationing when issues are oversubscribed is disclosed 
publicly and allocated by random ballot. Thus two investors bidding for the 
same number of shares have an equal chance of receiving an allocation. 
Using data on 66 IPO's, Koh and Walter established a negative relationship 
between allocation and the degree of underpricing, and that average initial 
returns fall substantially from 27% to 1 %, when adjusted for rationing. 
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Keasy and Short (1982) cite a criticism regarding the empirical testing of the 
Winner's Curse model, in that the distinction of informed and uninformed 
defies precise empirical testing. Within their study, Koh and Walters (1989) 
use the size of the application as a proxy for the distinction between informed 
and uninformed investors. However, it cannot be ruled out that information 
asymmetry is most severe "within" groups as opposed to between informed 
(assumed institutional investors) and uninformed (assumed retail investors). 
Other empirical tests of the Winner's Curse model have been conducted and 
Levis (1990) conducts a similar analysis to that of Koh and Walters, by 
analyzing the underpricing of 123 IPO's in the United Kingdom during the 
period January 1985 to December 1988. In Levi's sample, the recorded 
unconditional average degree of underpricing was 8.6%, but declined to 
5.14% or less for medium and small-sized applications conditional on being 
allocated stock. Thus while rationing was recorded to have an impact on 
reducing initial returns among small or uninformed investors, within this 
particular study, the returns were found to still be above zero. 
Similar studies conducted in Finland by Keloharju (1993) and in Israel by 
Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh (2003) generally found that uninformed IPO 
investors do not appear to break even at all. Interestingly, within Israel, 
empirical research found that uninformed investors actually earned a negative 
allocation-weighted initial return of (1.2%) on average. 
Looking at South African research, Hyslop (1990), looked at the returns 
achieved for unseasoned new issues on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
during the period 1983 to 1990. The study took into consideration the 
probability of obtaining an allocation and the opportunity cost associated with 
subscription. 
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In South Africa, the allocation of shares for over-subscribed new issues is 
required to be done in a "fair and equitable" manner. New issues that are 
over-subscribed are either allocated on the basis of a fixed percentage of the 
shares applied for or for a minimum quantity of shares based on a sliding 
scale ballot system. The chance of obtaining an allocation depends on the 
number of times the offer is over-subscribed. 
Hyslop's results show that the smallest category of uninformed investors earn 
a return equal to the riskless rate, however, a greater proportion of 
uninformed investors earn an increasingly negative return. Hyslop categorized 
uninformed investors according to the rand value of affordability: 
Can afford to invest: 
Small R250.00 up to R500.00 
Medium R1000.00 up to R5000.00 
Large R10 000 up to R50 000 
In another study, Brown (1995) studied the returns achieved by uninformed 
investors that applied for all initial public offers on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange during the period 1983 to 1995. Transaction costs and the 
probability of obtaining a share allocation were taken into account. The result 
of the study indicate, in general, the actual returns of uninformed investors 
were not significantly different from zero once transaction costs and the 
probability of obtaining a share allocation were taken into account. 
Interestingly, Brown records as part of his results, that the study suggests that 
the larger investors are probably less informed and thus more selective in 
their stock picking. 
The above assertion levelled by Brown continues to receive vigorous debate 
amongst researchers and practitioners. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) show that 
institutional investors balance their apparent preferential treatment in 
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underpriced offerings; however, institutional investors take similarly large 
positions in overpriced offerings. Thus, according to this study [although 
limited to the US market], arrives at the conclusion that institutions do not 
appear to cherry-pick the best offerings. Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002) 
find that institutional investors earn greater returns on their IPO allocations 
than do retail investors. 
Research also shows that underwriters can favour preferred investors by 
allocating them more issues in "hot issues" that are expected to trade up 
sharply in the aftermarket. 
2.3.3 Empirical research on ex - ante uncertainty and underpricing 
It is posited that the primary testable implication of the Winner's Curse model 
is the degree of underpricing given the greater "ex ante uncertainty". 
Fundamental to this prediction is that as ex ante uncertainty increases the 
Winner's Curse problem is further intensified. The consequence is such that 
"in order to be willing to submit a purchase order for shares in an offering with 
greater ex ante uncertainty, a representative [uninformed] investor will 
demand that more money be left on the table, in an expected value sense, via 
underpricing" Beaty and Ritter (1986:216). 
The key challenge cited by the majority of researchers that focus on 
underpricing and ex ante uncertainty, is the difficulty in controlling for ex ante 
uncertainty. In this instance, ex ante uncertainty is defined as uncertainty 
about the offerings value once it starts trading, thus the investor is uncertain 
of the after-market price Clarkson (1994). As noted by Beaty and Ritter 
(1984), a common finding that is expected to emerge from empirical tests, is 
such that the greater ex ante uncertainty observed should result in the 
researcher also witnessing greater variability of initial returns, given the higher 
risk. In addition to this, the efficacy of the proxies selected to measure ex ante 
uncertainty will also be observed. 
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The various proxies that have been used can be categorized into four broad 
categories; Company characteristics; Offering characteristics; Prospectus 
disclosure; Aftermarket variables. 
Examples of proxies that have been tested in prior research papers include: 
Company characteristics: 
Firm Age 
Sales/Firm size 
Retained Equity 
Offering characteristics 
Underwriter quality/reputation 
Auditor reputation 
Firm commitment offering 
Gross proceeds from the offering 
Prospectus disclosure 
Risk factors listed in the prospectus 
The uses of proceeds from the IPO 
Aftermarket variables 
Trading Volume 
Volatility 
A brief review of empirical research conducted on proxies that are listed within 
the above-listed shall follow. This review is not exhaustive; it provides a 
subjective selection of published empirical research papers that have focused 
on some of the proxies listed. 
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2.3.3.1 Company characteristics - Retained Equity 
The amount of equity retained by the owners/founders of the firm, at the time 
of an IPO is one of the more researched signals investigated in IPO research. 
The extent, to which the owners retain equity within the company, is also a 
disclosure revealed in the prospectus, and thus is considered an observable 
signal that is known prior to listing. 
Potential investors in an IPO would take into consideration any significant 
changes in ownership prior to the IPO, and may consider divesture by firm 
insiders prior to listing as a possible warning signal to the success of the IPO. 
The level of retained equity therefore serves as a signal to investors of the 
confidence that the management/owners have in the future prospects of the 
firm, the higher level of ownership, signaling greater confidence. Greater 
retained equity should therefore result in reduced underpricing (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). 
Empirical support for the above explanation posited by Leland and Pyle has 
been mixed. Downes and Heinkel (1982) conducted a study using American 
data; whilst Clarkson et al. (1991) conducted a similar research study using 
Canadian data. These studies produced results that supported a positive 
relationship between retained ownership and higher market valuation 
achieved at the time of listing. 
Keasey and McGuinness (1992) using British data, found some support for a 
positive relationship between market valuation and retained ownership. Keasy 
and McGuinness (1992) contribute an important consideration to the topic, in 
that the size of the firm and hence firm value can have an influence on equity 
retention levels in new listings. Smaller firms may need to issue more equity 
to create a larger market in their shares and thus reduce the possibility of thin 
trading volumes post-listing. 
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In contrast, the empirical research conducted by Speiss and Pettway (1997), 
produces inconsistent results in regards to the implied logic of the signaling 
model of retained ownership. Within their findings, the researchers observe 
that pre-IPO shareholders sell personal shares at the time of the IPO in half of 
all the IPO's included within their sample. This phenomenon occurred 
predominantly amongst those firms categorized as "high quality" firms within 
this particular study. These findings suggest that insiders within high-quality 
firms do not wait to realize the benefit of their underpricing signal by delaying 
to sell a portion of their holdings within the listing firm. In a Canadian study 
conducted by Krinsky and Rotenberg (1989), these researchers did not 
observe any relationship, between retained equity by owners and 
underpricing. 
An additional observation is that the motives for listing also need to be taken 
into consideration, with respect to the retained ownership proxy. It is assumed 
that the primary aim of the owners of the firm is to maximize the value of 
proceeds from listing; whilst underwriters are looking to ensure that there are 
no liquidity problems in the trading of the firm's shares post-listing. The 
differing motive of these two key stakeholders is an important consideration 
that needs to be factored into the analysis of the equity retention levels. 
2.3.3.2 Offering characteristics - Auditor prestige 
In their study published in 1986, Titman and Trueman propose that 
entrepreneurs with favorable inside information to present to investors will hire 
high-quality auditors. Corroborating these findings, Feltman, Hughes and 
Simunic (1991), found that the selection of auditors by a company looking to 
list for the first time, was a positive signal to investors, as high-quality auditors 
will be less subject to pressures from firm management, as well as being 
more discriminating in their audit. 
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It is proposed that the auditor has substantial reputational capital at risk, as 
well as possible legal risk, should it be found that the firm failed to reveal 
potentially negative IPO information. As a result, the selection of auditor is 
also taken to reveal the confidence that the management has of the firm's 
current and future prospects. It is proposed that entrepreneurs who believe 
that unfavorable information about the firm and its prospects will negatively 
impact investors' perceptions are unlikely to hire high-quality auditors (Daily, 
Certo, Dalton and Roengpitya, 2003). As a result, it is proposed that the 
selection of auditors provides a credible signal of the quality of the IPO 
offering. 
Although auditor quality can serve as an important signal regarding the quality 
of the issuance, the majority of empirical studies base the "quality" of an 
auditing firm on what is termed "reputational effect". Within South Africa, the 
Big Four Audit firms (Deloitte, Price Waterhouse Coopers, KPMG and Ernst 
and Young) would be considered the "High Quality" Audit firms, premised on 
the fact that they wield a greater global as well as local reputation. 
This is not to say that those audit firms considered second-tier, do not follow 
GAAPIIFRS standards. More importantly, the recent corporate governance 
scandals that include but are not limited to Enron (Arthur Andersen - USA), 
Health and Racket Club (Deloitte - South Africa) and more recently Fidentia 
Holdings (KPMG - South Africa) have involved audit and accounting firms that 
would otherwise be considered "high quality" firms. This therefore calls to 
question the validity of the claim that the "high quality" audit firms are less 
likely to bow to management pressure and can be relied upon to provide 
independent audits. 
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This proxy has also been criticized on the basis that smaller firms may not be 
able to afford the high audit fees charged by the first-tier audit firms. 
Furthermore, for those firms that auditing firms consider being "high risk 
clients", large audit firms charge a fee that is sufficient to cover potential 
reputational and litigation costs. Hogan (1997) posits that issuing firms 
perform a trade-off between contracting the services of a high quality firm 
(thereby reducing underpricing) and cost and thus select an audit firm that 
minimizes the sum of these costs. This trade-off may result in high risk clients 
selecting a low quality audit firm. 
2.3.3.3 Prospectus disclosure - Use of proceeds 
It is proposed that an inverse relationship should exist between use of 
proceeds specificity and underpricing. Use of proceeds disclosure aids 
investors in evaluating IPO's, in the sense that it helps them to narrow their 
estimate of the dispersion of the share's price after listing (Leone, Rock and 
Willenborg, 2006). Firms are reluctant to provide full disclosure, because of 
fear of giving away proprietary information thereby losing some competitive 
advantage. Firms are also reluctant to provide full disclosure due to potential 
legal liabilities that may arise from such disclosures. 
A widely cited paper with regards to use of proceeds, is that of Leone et al 
(2006) who observe that increased specificity of intended use of proceeds in 
the prospectus leads to lower underpricing. However, a common problem 
highlighted in the use of this proxy, is the absence of standardized rules 
regarding what uses must be disclosed. Due to this, it remains unclear 
whether variation in these measures reflects underlying differences in 
uncertainty or merely in drafting (Ljungqvist, 2006). 
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As a possible remedy to this problem, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) propose 
that a better assessment of the use of proceeds measure would be to 
differentiate whether firms are to use the proceeds to fund "operating 
expenses", where it may be construed that the firm is looking to investors to 
fund management's inability to effectively control costs, and thus presenting 
greater risk, versus, use of proceeds funding investment or reducing debt 
which could be considered to be of potentially less risk. 
2.3.3.4 Aftermarket Variables 
The above listed proxies of trading volume and volatility are measurable 
based on information available only after time of listing. 
Clarkson (1984) advances the notion of a hierarchy of proxies. Those proxies 
that provide strongest evidence in the prediction of increasing ex ante 
uncertainty should result in an increase in underpricing. This study involved a 
sample of 420 US IPO's during the period 1976 to 1985. The outcome of the 
research established that there was hierarchy of proxies with the dominant 
being, firm age and risk factors identified within the prospectus. 
,10 
Un
ive
r i
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
2.4 Disclosure 
2.4.1 Introduction 
An IPO setting would be characterized by a certain degree of information 
asymmetry, and thus, this setting should see firms involved in the IPO 
process, disclose a high level of information in order to reduce the information 
asymmetry between management and potential investors. (Strom, 2004) 
Early studies (see Rock (1986), Beaty and Ritter (1986)) that deal with the 
topic of disclosure within an IPO setting, give mention to the reasoning that an 
issuer may choose to give detail within the prospectus, (or relevant listing 
material) in order to reduce ex ante uncertainty. Uncertainty is primarily 
regarding the value of their shares and the extent to which the IPO is 
underpriced (Rock 1986; Beaty and Ritter 1986). 
The alternative is such that companies may fear revealing proprietary 
information to competitors and therefore limit the extent of detail included 
within the prospectus. 
The focus of this literature review will be to analyze this trade-off faced by 
issuing firms. The majority of accounting and finance theory examined is in 
general agreement that by disclosing more information, a firm can lower its 
cost of capital. Certain researchers do however cite the possibility of losses 
being sustained by firms through disclosure of proprietary information. 
Empirical research to date, gives mixed results in providing concrete evidence 
of a causal link between disclosure and a reduction in the cost of capital, 
evidenced through reduced underpricing. 
;10 
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In addition to this, proxies for disclosure vary between studies, with limited 
research available utilizing the prospectus as a source of disclosure 
information. This paper will look to advance current understanding on a vexing 
issue in accounting and finance research, whether firm disclosure exhibits any 
measurable economic consequences (Schrand and Verrecchia, 2004) 
2.4.2 Defining Disclosure 
The definitions for "corporate disclosure" are varied. The majority of 
contemporary empirical studies rely on the definition proffered by the 
Association of Investment and Management Research (AIMR). AIMR whose 
objective is to improve corporate communication, categorises corporate 
disclosure into three categories: Published information, Investor Relations, 
and Annual Reports. (The Reports of the Financial Analysts {FAE Report} in 
Lang and Lundholm 1993). 
Strom (2004) categorises disclosure as either regulated information (i.e. 
annual reports) or non-regulated information; non-regulated information is 
regarded as optional or voluntary information, supplied as additional 
information to regulated information. 
The above definitions are limited in that they either make specific reference to 
the annual report, or other communications tools, for instance, press releases. 
However, the prospectus serves as both a type of direct communication tool 
that can contain voluntary information, whilst remaining a document strictly 
regulated in terms of its compilation and statutory information requirements. 
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In South Africa, the prospectus is issued subject to compliance to the JSE 
"Listing Requirements" and in compliance with the listing requirements of the 
Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973). Both sets of compliance documents 
give emphasis to adherence to specific statutory disclosures in compilation of 
the prospectus. Companies looking to list on the AltX would need to 
demonstrate, in addition to adhering to common law duty of disclosure of all 
material information in the prospectus, adherence to section 148(1 )(a) of the 
Companies Act (South Africa, 1973). 
This section imposes a statutory duty of disclosure on those responsible for 
the issue of a prospectus. In terms of this section 'every prospectus shall 
contain a fair presentation of the state of the affairs of the company, the 
shares of which are being offered and shall state at least the matters specified 
in, and set out the reports referred to in, Part I and Part II of Schedule 3. 
Although providing specific guidelines with regards to the statutory information 
to be included within the prospectus, the discretion regarding the level of 
detail within the prospectus lies with the directors of each company. 
The variability in the level of detail provided within the prospectus of each 
issuing company, gives motivation to this study. An issuer can satisfy the 
requirements by providing specific details, vague overview, or something in-
between (Leone, Rock and Willenborg, 2006). U
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2.4.3 Review of theoretical literature supporting a negative association 
between disclosure level and cost of equity capital 
The main focus of this section will on be on theoretical research papers that 
are directly related to the topic of information asymmetry. The paper will 
primarily review theories which are underpinned by the rationale that greater 
disclosure will result in beneficial capital market effects. On a firm level, these 
benefits would be a reduction in the cost of capital as evidenced through 
reduced underpricing. 
Some of the benefits of increased disclosure cited within the theoretical 
disclosure research studies are as follows: 
i. Overcoming adverse selection 
ii. Reducing transaction costs in the market, and; 
iii. Reducing expected legal costs 
Although this research paper does not directly research the topic of capital 
costs, it does present research relating to the topic. This will facilitate later 
analysis and interpretation of the empirical research findings of the study. Of 
primary interest in the review of literature supporting the above motivations, is 
whether the theories provide credibility to the assertion, greater disclosure has 
positive economic consequences for the firm, specifically, the reduction of 
underpricing. An analysis of the main theories is presented below, with a 
discussion on the rationale supporting each theory. 
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Theoretical research regarding the benefit that accrues to firms that increase 
disclosure, posits that greater disclosure will allow for more accurate 
forecasting by investors of the future cashflows of a company. In addition, 
increased and better disclosure should also result in a reduction in the 
uncertainty component within the discount rate applied by investors when 
determining the value of the firm, using discounted cashflow analysis. 
The same rationale regarding a reduction in the discount rate, would apply in 
the risk premium charged by financial institutions lending to the firm. Better 
disclosure should also encourage lenders to reduce the risk premium (spread) 
applied when lending funds to the firm. Myers and Majluf (1994), highlight that 
if information asymmetry is not resolved, firms will view making public equity 
offers to be costly for existing shareholders. There is therefore an incentive for 
managers who anticipate raising funds through equity issuance in the capital 
market, to provide disclosures in order to reduce the information asymmetry 
problem, thereby reducing the firm's cost of external financing. 
2.4.3.1 Improved After-market Liquidity 
Theories that support a negative association between disclosure level and 
cost of equity capital have followed mainly two related themes (Botosan, 
1997). The initial theme deals with stock market liquidity and describes how 
enhanced disclosure can improve the market liquidity for a particular firm's 
shares, thereby reducing the equity cost of capital of that firm. This is 
achieved either through reduced transaction costs or an increase in the 
demand for a firm's shares. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) further developed this proposition, in putting 
forward the notion that in a low information environment, a trade is expected 
to reveal private information. The authors suggest that greater disclosure 
adds to the amount of information revealed by a trade. 
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The resulting effect is such that investors would be more willing to take larger 
equity stakes in a company than they would otherwise do. 
This should increase the demand for a company's shares, thereby increasing 
liquidity, increasing the share price of that company, and reducing the cost of 
equity capital. 
2.4.3.2 Disclosure and Ex-ante Uncertainty 
This second theme proposes that with greater information, the uncertainty 
experienced by investors in assessing the future return profile can be 
reduced; hence a negative relationship between disclosure policy and 
estimation risk. Should this be achieved, it is expected that the discount rate 
applied by investors in their valuation of the firm would be reduced, which 
would subsequently reduce the cost of equity capital. 
In assessing whether to invest in a particular company, the investor must 
adjudge the company's return profile and its ability to generate returns in 
excess of its cost of capital. Investors would also take into account the 
company's history and other sources of information on the company, 
however, in a low information environment, or in an IPO-setting where there 
may be limited historical information on the firm; greater uncertainty exists. 
According to Clarkson, Guedes & Thompson (1996), if estimation risk is non-
diversifiable, investors would therefore require additional compensation for 
this risk. 
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2.4.3.3 Legal Liability 
Certain researchers have forwarded a theory of legal liability as motivation for 
disclosure. The rationale behind this theory is that firms can mitigate adverse 
price volatility or a negative price response by releasing earnings forecasts 
prior to the mandatory disclosure. In this way, the firm is able to reduce 
expected legal costs that may arise on release of the mandatory disclosure. 
The pre-release of the bad earnings news, mitigates the impact of a negative 
price response and therefore the potential reduction in firm value (Lang and 
Lundholm, 2003). 
This hypothesis presumes, in the absence of litigation, that managers have an 
incentive to time the disclosure of good news and bad news symmetrically. It 
is assumed that rationale investors would focus on whether there were delays 
in the announcement of poor earnings forecasts. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) highlight an important question regarding the validity 
of the rationale that underpins this theory. The question of whether delaying 
bad news until a required earnings announcement is evidence that 
management did not disclose information to investors in a timely manner? 
Furthermore, it can be argued that in some instances litigation could 
potentially reduce the incentive to disclose if management believes that the 
participants within the capital market penalize forecasts in any event, due to 
their inability to distinguish between unexpected forecast errors due to chance 
and deliberate management bias. 
Although a valid management concern, the aforementioned argument fails to 
give mention to the credibility of the disclosure policy of the firm. As 
suggested by Kothari (2001), the fact that stock prices react to earnings 
announcements, suggests that overall, investors regard accounting 
information as credible 
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However, the author poses the question as to whether the credibility of such 
information arises from the potential legal liability firm management is 
exposed to, for misleading disclosures. 
The theory of legal liability is also largely dependent on a number of 
considerations, such as the current financial situation of the company, 
whether it is in financial distress or not; whether the firm has previously 
followed a consistent disclosure policy or not; whether the motivation for the 
disclosure is to correct overvaluation or undervaluation of the firm's share 
price. Due to the need to take into consideration a number of other variables 
in order to validate legal liability as motivation for disclosure, the effectiveness 
of this theory remains unclear. 
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2.4.4 Review of Empirical Research on Disclosure 
2.4.4.1 Introduction 
Although existing empirical research tends to support a negative association 
between disclosure level and cost of equity capital, the extent to which firms 
benefit from increased disclosure remains a controversial issue. Empirical 
results have yielded mixed evidence of an association between disclosure 
and the reduction of the equity cost of capital. 
In most cases, prior researchers have examined the impact of disclosure on 
variables that are expected to be associated to the cost of equity capital 
(Botosan, 1997). This indirect approach at measuring the association between 
disclosure and equity cost of capital estimates, highlights the difficulties faced 
by many researchers establishing this association. 
Expanding on the aforementioned difficulty; to date, the majority of research 
output has primarily utilised data from the United States. As stated by Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000), this environment is information rich, in terms of having 
more participants and intermediaries involved in the generation of information, 
such that fewer resources are spent on acquiring information on a particular 
firm. Un
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2.4.4.2 The impact of Analyst following on Disclosure and 
Underpricing research 
The observed affluence in availability of information within the United States is 
partly attributable to having a very high number of analysts and research firms 
that generate research output on the firms (Botosan, 1997) documents a 
disclosure policy effect on the cost of equity capital, but only for companies 
with low analyst coverage. From this research, it can be inferred that when a 
company is followed or researched by a high proportion of analysts, the 
availability of information on that company is so rich, that measuring a 
disclosure policy effect on the equity cost of capital becomes difficult. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that increased disclosure lowers the cost of 
information acquisition for analysts, and therefore induces greater analyst 
following of such firms. Thus, if firms increase disclosure, this should lead to 
greater analyst following, resulting in more information being made available 
to the investing public, thereby reducing information asymmetry. In theory, this 
reasoning is valid, however, in most instances; investors rely on the research 
output generated by analysts, as part of their investment decision to buy the 
issuance in an IPO. 
The dispersion in the recommendation and research reports of analysts can 
also add to uncertainty in the investor's investment decision and assessment. 
Thus, increased analyst coverage can result in more information being made 
available, with little effect on reducing the uncertainty surrounding the IPO, if 
there is substantial dispersion in analyst recommendations. 
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2.4.4.3 
research 
Subjectivity in approach to Disclosure and Underpricing 
In their study, Lang and Lundholm (2000:67) cite the following: "we limit our 
sample to small firms, given their limited analyst following; they are most likely 
to use their disclosure policy to influence market perceptions." 
Although empirical results sUbstantiate this reasoning, a possible drawback to 
this approach in verifying the effect of disclosure on reducing asymmetry is 
such that the types of disclosures measured are subjective, as is the sample 
selection of companies. Neither disclosure level nor cost of capital can be 
observed directly and both variables rely heavily on individual perception 
rather than actual use (Hail, 2001). 
In addition, the measure of disclosure in the majority of papers reviewed thus 
far, record the presence or lack thereof, of a specific disclosure item/category. 
This was evident in the present study of the disclosure content within the 
prospectuses of firms listing on the AltX within the period of review. There 
were distinct variances amongst the firms regarding the depth of disclosure. 
This approach therefore is limited in measuring the quality of disclosure items. 
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2.4.4.4 The impact of the Institutional Environment on Disclosure 
and Underpricing research 
The institutional environment is another important factor in measuring a 
disclosure policy effect. Hail (2001), hypothesises the effect of disclosure 
policy on the cost of capital, using the Swiss capital market. This market was 
selected for the high degree of freedom in setting disclosure policy, given the 
low levels of mandatory accounting standards. 
This capital market is small, highly concentrated, and to a certain extent, 
illiquid. The intention of the researcher was two-fold; to provide indirect 
evidence as to the difficulty experienced in measuring a disclosure policy 
effect, and to test the hypothesis within a capital market environment that 
provides substantial discretion to companies as to the extent of overall 
information content. 
In the study of the Swiss capital markets, Hail (2001), summarises four key 
problems: 
1. The quality of corporate disclosures cannot be assessed objectively 
and relies heavily on the perception and not the actual use of 
disclosure; 
2. Firms might not choose disclosure levels independently, which makes 
the variable subject to self-selection bias; 
3. There is no direct measure of the firm's prospective cost of capital nor 
of its components; 
4. The relationship between a firm's disclosure level and the market's 
profitability expectations might be weak or confounded by several other 
factors so that no significant association is found. 
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2.4.4.5 Disclosure and Information Asymmetry Components 
Previous studies have provided limited research guidance in establishing the 
most appropriate proxies for the information asymmetry component of the 
Cost of Capital (Core, 2001). In most cases the authors try to relate corporate 
disclosures, the information asymmetry component, and not the entire cost of 
capital, as this procedure offers a more direct test of the predicted association 
(Hail, 2001). This section provides a review of the three dominant proxies for 
information asymmetry; they are provided in order of prominence on the basis 
of the reviewed research, where greater proportions of statistically significant 
results were achieved. The three proxies are Bid-ask spread; Trading volume; 
and Share price volatility. 
1. Bid-Ask Spread 
The bid-ask spread is the difference between the "bid price" [the highest price 
a buyer of a share is willing to pay], whilst the "ask price" [the lowest price a 
seller of a share is willing to sell]. In order for a transaction to occur, the price 
at which the seller [asking price] is willing to sell, and the price at which a 
buyer [bid price] is willing to pay, need to be the same. The analysis of the 
difference between the bids and asking prices of particular shares should 
reveal the perceptions of both buyers and sellers and thereby reveal the 
extent of information asymmetry. 
Large spreads imply lower trading volume for a share, whilst lower spreads, 
will imply higher trading volumes. Literature to date has established that one 
way to measure transaction costs is through analyzing the bid-ask spread. 
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A number of researchers posit that information asymmetry manifests itself in 
transaction costs. In addition, the bid-ask spread is easily observable and 
measured, thus its prominence in use as a proxy for measuring information 
asymmetry. 
Although most frequently cited in the majority of papers reviewed, the bid-ask 
spread as a proxy for information asymmetry has come under criticism as it is 
influenced by a number of other determinants other than disclosure policy 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). This study also recorded a negative relationship 
between bid-ask spread and trading volume, share price and market maker 
competition, and recorded a positive relationship to share price volatility and 
the presence of insiders. 
An alternative method of assessing the extent of information asymmetry in 
relation to the bid-ask spread, is by measuring liquidity. Bid ask spreads can 
be used as a proxy for market liquidity. 
Despite on-going debate with regards to the appropriateness of the bid-ask 
spread as a suitable measure of information asymmetry, it remains widely 
used and referenced proxy, due to its ease of measurement. 
Within South Africa, a study conducted by Negash (2001) disaggregated the 
bid-ask spread into three components: order-processing costs, inventory 
holding costs and an information related element. This study observed that 
the spread's information component for JSE listed firms is between 54% and 
71 %. Such results give credence to the use of the bid-ask spread as a 
suitable tool of analysis of the disclosure policy effect on information 
asymmetry in South Africa, with particular focus on the AltX. 
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2. Trading Volume 
The trading volume of a share is another frequently used proxy used for 
information asymmetry. The greater the amount of information available on a 
specific share, then investors can, with greater ease, price and trade the 
share. Trading volume is therefore a proxy that can demonstrate investors' 
willingness to trade shares of a firm. The willingness of investors to trade the 
shares will in turn be influenced to a certain extent by the level of information 
asymmetry regarding the share (Welker, 1995). 
As with the bid-ask spread, trading volume as a proxy for information 
asymmetry is affected by other factors other than information-related factors. 
These factors include portfolio rebalancing, liquidity shocks and changes in 
risk preferences Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). Research conducted by Bartov 
and Bodnar (1996) indicates how trading volume around certain information 
events can actually be positively related to disagreement between market 
participants with regards to the future prospects of a company. Such findings 
do indicate that trading volume may not exclusively capture adverse selection 
amongst investors. 
3. Share Price Volatility 
In the absence of information asymmetry, share price movements should be 
smooth. This is the underlying reasoning to the third (although lesser used) 
proxy for information asymmetry. Hence low levels of share price volatility 
suggest little information asymmetry. The volatility of a firm's share price can 
be perceived to present an elevated investment risk of that particular firm, and 
thus increase the cost of capital of the firm Bushee and Noe (2000). In 
addition, the researchers also recorded that higher share volatility is related to 
a greater likelihood of shareholder class action lawsuits. 
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Lang and Lundholm (1993) cite that firms with volatile share prices might 
change their disclosure policy to address potential litigation costs that might 
arise from sudden price shocks. 
It is noted, however, that a number of non-information related factors can 
influence the volatility of a firm's share price. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
record this proxy as the noisiest measure of information asymmetry. These 
researchers were unable to document a statistically significant disclosure 
policy effect on share price volatility. 
Share price volatility is the least popular measure of information asymmetry, 
primarily due to the elevated exposure to "noise" that is factored into share 
price volatility. Some empirical findings, have actually found that too much 
information disclosure, can also cause greater share price volatility. This is 
evidenced in studies conducted by Bushee and Noe (2000) as well as 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), where they link timely disclosure to a higher 
cost of equity capital. 
This section concludes an overview of the key theoretical and empirical 
research papers on the subject of underpricing, disclosure and information 
asymmetry. This literature review, although not exhaustive, offers an 
indication of where this current research endeavour is placed within this area 
of research. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the primary research objective of this study which is to 
measure the extent of underpricing of the 41 IPO's that have taken place on 
the AltX during the period October 2003 to 31 March 2007. As far as the 
author is aware, this study will be the first study of its kind, in terms of 
reviewing the underpricing of firms listed on the AltX during the selected time 
period. 
The secondary objective of this research thesis is to ascertain whether 
disclosure has an effect on the extent of underpricing experienced by firms. 
The research will specifically look at examining the relation between the 
extent of detail the issuer provides within the prospectus, regarding the use of 
the proceeds they will raise from the offering, and compare this to the first-day 
underpricing recorded by each firm. It is proposed that an increase in 
specificity is associated with lower underpricing (Leone, Rock and Willenborg, 
2006). 
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3.2 Research Process 
3.2.1 Research Process with regards to Hypothesis 1 
In order to test the hypothesis of whether new listings to the AltX were 
underpriced, the following stages of research were undertaken: 
Stage 1: Literature Review 
The literature review was conducted with an aim to determine what research 
has been undertaken on the research topic. The existing literature dealing 
with underpricing of unseasoned equity offerings was reviewed. This was 
necessary in order to obtain an understanding of the theories forwarded to 
describe why underpricing occurs, as well as to understand the approach 
taken by various empirical studies performed to date, that have attempted to 
measure underpricing. 
This study follows a similar approach to a previous eminent South African 
study conducted by Barlow and Sparks in 1986. Barlow and Sparks (1986) 
consider the extent of underpricing of 105 newly issued shares on the JSE 
during the period 1972 to 1986. 
It should be noted that their investigation entailed a longer time period 
[fourteen years] and included a larger sample of firms. As mentioned 
previously, their study looked only at new listings on the JSE. 
// 
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The present study identifies 41 firms that have listed on the AltX during the 
period October 2003 and March 2007. The process of elimination applied to 
the overall population is specified in Section 1.5 (Research Limitations), is 
restated as follows: 
• Only the issuance of ordinary shares were considered in underpricing 
research and disclosure research; 
• Only new listings were taken into consideration. The definition of new 
listings excludes companies that migrated from the OCM and VCM 
boards of the JSE, within the period of review; 
• Reverse takeovers and cash shells methods of listing were not include 
within the research; introductions where there is no issue or sale of 
shares were also not included within this study; 
• Other forms of announcements of communication by the firm, such as 
newspaper inserts, media briefings or road shows, were not included 
as part of disclosures. The prospectus was taken to be primary 
document of information. 
On application of the above selection criteria; sixteen firms were removed 
from the population and resulting in a sample of twenty-five firms. Of this 
sample of twenty-five firms, each firm is tested for underpricing utilising the 
same approach as that of Barlow and Sparks (1986). According to the study 
conducted by Barlow and Sparks (1986), underpricing was calculated as: 
" the last transaction price on the first day of trading divided by the issue price, 
minus one." 
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An identified key difference between the present study and that of Barlow and 
Sparks (1986) is that the preferred method of listing on the AltX is by Private 
Placement as opposed to a direct equity issuance to the general public. 
Private Placement entails companies placing the newly issued shares with 
selected parties through private negotiation Magliolo (2004:25). It is therefore 
not a direct issuance of unseasoned equity to the general public. In addition to 
this, all companies listing on the AltX must make use of a Designated Advisor 
(DA), as opposed to the traditional Merchant Banks or Sponsors utilised on 
the JSE. However, all references in the listing requirements to sponsors apply 
mutatis mutandis to DA's for companies that are applying for or which have a 
listing on the AltX Magliolo (2004: 135). 
Stage 2: Data Gathering 
The data gathering with respect to testing Hypothesis 1 used the following 
information sources: 
The primary source of data with regards to sourcing the full company names, 
listing dates and the names of Designated Advisor assigned to each listed 
company, was the Alternative Exchange of South Africa website: 
www.altx.co.za 
According to the AltX list of companies on the AltX website, 42 companies 
have been listed on the AltX from its inception. 41 companies were extracted 
from this population and identified as companies listed within the period of 
study, being 27 October 2003 to 31 March 2007. 
Within the sample, is a range of companies representing a number of 
different sectors, such as chemical, building and construction, engineering, 
retail and food, financial and mining sectors. 
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The primary source of data, with regards to sourcing the opening and closing 
prices on the first day of trade for each share, was the website: 
www.sharedata.co.za. 
Stage 3: Data Preparation and Analysis 
The collected data was compiled and collated on a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. Manipulations were performed to create the following fields: 
• Company Name 
• JSE - Share Code 
• Listing Date 
• Issue Price 
• Closing share price 
• Percentage level of underpricing 
The company name, JSE Share Code and listing date were obtained from the 
company list available on the AltX website, www.altx.co.za. 
The opening and closing prices of shares on their first day of listing were 
obtained from the website, www.sharedata.co.za. 
In order to measure the extent of underpricing of each share, the following 
calculation was applied: 
Issue price _ 1 
cto sin g share price 
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Scope and Limitation 
The empirical investigation envisaged in this study is limited to a three year 
period, specifically 27 October 2003 to 31 March 2007. This period covers the 
first three and a half years of existence of the AltX, and was considered to 
provide a sufficient time-period. The proposed time period also provided an 
adequate number of firms to include within a sample, from which statistically 
robust results can be inferred. 
The study excludes all firms that listed on the AltX that were transferred from 
the Development Capital or Venture Capital Boards of the JSE. The focus of 
this research report was to record and analyse the underpricing of 
unseasoned equity listings on the AltX; thus, it was considered prudent to 
exclude those firms that would have recorded a previous trading history on 
the Development and Venture Capital Boards of the JSE. This criterion was 
also extended to those firms that were or are currently listed on the United 
Kingdom, Alternative Investment Market (AIM). AIM is based in London, and 
is the junior stock exchange to the London Stock Exchange. The AltX is 
modelled very closely on AIM. 
The number of firms that were direct transfers from Development and Venture 
Capital Boards of the JSE totalled seven. The number of firms that listed on 
the AltX by means of a reverse listing, totalled, seven. One firm was excluded 
on the basis of having traded for over one year on London's Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM). One firm was excluded on the basis of the "offer" 
constituting Participatory Interests within a Fund, as opposed to ordinary 
shares. 
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Eliminations can therefore be summarised as follows: 
Elimination (OVB or VCB of JSE) 
Elimination (Reverse listing or other) 
Elimination (AIM) 
Elimination (Not ordinary shares) 
TOTAL 
7 
7 
1 
1 
16 
This research focuses only on the measurement of underpricing based on the 
issue price and the last transaction price on the first day of trading. This 
measurement method is consistent with the method utilised within a previous 
research paper conducted by Barlow and Sparks (1986). The analysis does 
not take into consideration the impact that over-subscription may have. 
The present study also differs in approach to another South African research 
paper, authored by Page and Reyneke (1997), where they incorporate the 
examination of the initial opening premium, from the viewpoint of an investor 
who is forced to purchase shares in the aftermarket. Their calculation of the 
initial return takes the closing day price on the last day of the first month-post 
listing, less the closing price on the first day of listing, divided by the closing 
price on the first day of listing. 
This section concludes the process followed to establish the sample of firms 
which could be analysed to assess the extent of underpricing on the AltX 
during the period under review of 27 October 2003 to 31 March 2007. 
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3.2.2 Research Process with regards to Hypothesis 2 
Stage 1: Literature Review 
The primary area of focus when reviewing literature relating to the second 
hypothesis was to identify empirical research which tested the relationship 
between disclosure and underpricing. Particular attention was given to 
identifying references to the specific use of proceeds within the prospectus. 
Previous literature was reviewed with a focus on those studies where 
researchers looked to record observable evidence of economic consequences 
of firm disclosure through measuring underpricing. 
The present study draws on the research of Leone Rock and Willenborg 
(2006). These researchers examined the relation between the extent of dollar 
detail an IPO issuer provides regarding their intended use of proceeds and 
the first day underpricing. 
The present study attempts to establish whether there is an observed 
relationship between the levels of disclosure evidenced by specific use of 
proceeds and underpricing. 
The tests conducted by Leone Rock and Willenborg (2006), go further in that 
the authors regress underpricing on determinants highlighted in previous 
literature, such as company size, age, book-to-market, high technology, 
exchange listing, ownership retention, pre-IPO price-setting, the number of 
risk factors, underwriter reputation, venture capital backing, auditor size, 
standard deviation of first year post returns and insider selling. 
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In addition, the research by Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006) focuses on 
the US Market, with the sample constituting 787 firm-commitment Initial Public 
Offerings by domestic, commercial companies; the time period for their study 
being January 1993 to December 1994. Although their study is over a shorter 
time period [two years], it does include a larger sample of firms. Identified 
similarities between the present research and that of Leone, Rock and 
Willenborg are: 
1. Both studies look to record variation in disclosure, through 
recording specific use of proceeds, and; 
2. Both studies look to establish whether a higher measure of 
specificity within the prospectus is matched by an observed lower 
underpricing of a share. 
As with the study by Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006), the present study 
also relies on a self-constructed disclosure measure. A similar approach is 
applied in the present study, whereby the variable for disclosure being 
"specificity", is constructed on the basis of identifying specific references 
made by companies, with regards to the actual rand value usage and break 
down, of the proceeds from listing. 
From reviewed literature, it is posited that disclosure indices are widely used 
in order to accurately capture the level of disclosure in a set of company-
related documents, such as annual reports, management reports or listing 
prospectus. The use of a self-disclosure index is argued to allow for the 
researcher to precisely seize the information required (Strom, 2006). In the 
context of this research study, the self-constructed index was considered a 
better proxy for the measurement of disclosure, when compared to two other 
proxies used in prior research. The two other measures cited in previous 
studies were management forecasts and AIMR disclosure ratings. 
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Management forecasts are included within the prospectuses of companies 
looking to list on the AltX. The accuracy and validity of all financial 
information, including management forecasts remain the responsibility of the 
directors of the company. The auditors of the company will provide limited 
assurance reports on the forecasts prepared by management, ensuring that 
the assumptions used are fair and reasonable. Criticisms have been levelled 
against the use of management forecasts as a proxy for disclosure, as they 
represent a small fraction of the entire information set that firms could produce 
and therefore they fail to capture much information Strom (2006). 
The second proxy, highlighted in a number or papers, is the use of the AIMR 
ratings. The AIMR ratings are used as a measure of disclosure quality used 
by analysts and provide a general measure of disclosure. AIMR uses a survey 
by which analysts respond about a firm's disclosure practices. These ratings 
are limited to the United States' equity market and that they have not been 
published since 1997. 
The "Specificity" measure devised by Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006), 
focuses on the extent to which companies elucidate the use of the proceeds 
they receive from their listing. Although this criterion involves a certain degree 
of subjectivity, with regards to the interpretation as to what constitutes 
"specificity", the authors clearly delineate their assessment as to what is 
considered a specific reference. U
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Stage 2: Data Gathering 
The prospectus of each firm served as the primary information source for data 
gathered in order to test Hypothesis 2. Each company's website was 
accessed to check whether the company had an electronic PDF copy of the 
prospectus, alternatively, physical copies were requested via e-mail 
communications from the Company Secretary, the Investor Relations 
representative, the Transfer Secretaries for each company, or the Designated 
Advisor. The same sample utilised in testing the first hypothesis was also 
used in testing the second hypothesis. 
Stage 3: Data Preparation and Analysis 
On obtaining each prospectus, the researcher read each prospectus from 
cover to cover. The main focus of the research was to identify the uses of 
proceeds from the listing process, outlined in the prospectus. As with Leone, 
Rock and Willenborg (2006), this research paper established two main 
classifications of use of proceeds, debt and non-debt usage. For consistency 
in research approach, the same classifications of usage were replicated in this 
study and are listed as follows: 
Specificity - Debt: 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for debt 
repayments. 
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Specificity - Non Debt 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
purposes other than debt repayment. 
Sub-categories of Specificity - Non Debt 
Specificity - ExpAcq 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
expansion or acquisitions. 
Specificity - R&D 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
R&D or product development. 
Specificity - Shrhlds 
Fraction of company's IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
distribution to pre - IPO shareholders. 
Specificity - AMPS 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
advertising, marketing, promotion or sales. 
Specificity - we 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
particular working capital uses. 
Specificity - Other 
Fraction of IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for other uses. 
This study applied the same rationale as that of Leone, Rock and Willenborg 
(2006) in that; vague references were classified as being commentary within 
the prospectus which is non specific in identifying actual rand-value usage of 
proceeds. Thus, "working capital and general corporate purposes" are not 
categorized as a specific use because this reference is too general Leone, 
Rock and Willenborg (2006). 
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The "Specificity" variable serves as a proxy for disclosure. Some of the 
advantages for use of this variable as a proxy for disclosure are that it is 
relatively easy to measure and that its timing precedes the offering date. 
In order to capture the above information, the following salient features were 
entered on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet: 
• Issue price 
• No. of shares to be issued 
• Estimated total proceeds 
• Costs related to listing 
• Net Proceeds from listing after expenses 
• Identified Rand value specific use of proceeds 
• A self-constructed calculation expressed as a percentage, for 
measuring the specificity of use pf proceeds. 
The "Specificity" calculation was as follows: 
SUM of: 
Total Proceeds specified to go towards reducing debt obligations, 
Plus 
Total Proceeds specified to go towards non-debt obligations (excluding 
general reference to working capital) 
Divided by: 
Gross Proceeds (less expenses from listing) 
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Scope and Limitation 
The use of a disclosure index is subjective and depends on the items included 
in the index and the interpretation of the specific items. The index reliability is 
dependent on replication, i.e. if the results can be replicated. A problem arises 
because of the researcher's subjectivity whether an item is included in the 
index or not (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The interpretation of the items 
included or excluded in the index involves a judgment by the researcher, 
which could lead to difficulties in replicating results. 
The self constructed measure as used in this thesis has the benefit of 
identifying and capturing exactly what the researcher intends. However, a 
limitation in the approach adopted by Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006) and 
of self-constructed indexes of similar design is that the measured variables 
are calculated as an index of actual (applicable) disclosure, with no reference 
to total possible (applicable) disclosure. 
The consequence of the key assumption that disclosure is jointly determined 
by managers' ability to formulate plans regarding the uses of proceeds and 
their decisions to disclose. Therefore, it is possible that in some instances 
where underpricing is observed, this underpricing may have nothing to do with 
a lack of disclosure. 
In addition, managers may not provide specific disclosures because they 
either do not know what they will do with the proceeds or the riskiness of the 
business is such that they require additional funding for flexibility. 
Given this scenario, although underpricing may be observed, it would be 
incorrect to draw a causal link, between observed underpricing and the lack of 
disclosure. 
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The above-mentioned dilemma highlights one of many alternative variables 
that can have an effect on the results of a study of this nature. The focus of 
this research was to establish whether it can be inferred that there is an 
observable negative relationship between specificity and underpricing (given 
the limitations of a small sample). 
This study deviates from the methodology used by Leone, Rock and 
Willenborg, by not conducting comprehensive regressions on a full list of 
factors identified in previous studies. Previous research suggests that these 
explanatory variables can affect underpricing and therefore could confound 
the results related to underpricing and disclosure. 
The list utilized by Leone, Rock and Willenborg, includes: 
Assets: 
Age: 
Book/Market 
High Tech: 
%Retained 
Price Update: 
Risk Factors: 
VC 
Big4: 
SD (Returns): 
%Insider. 
Pre - IPO total assets 
Years from founding or incorporation, if founding date is 
unavailable, to IPO 
Pre IPO shareholder's equity / (Gross IPO Proceeds/ (1 -
%Retained) 
One if a high tech firm and zero otherwise 
% of voting common stock retained by pre - IPO 
shareholders 
IPO price per share/Mid-point of initial share price range 
Number of risk factors listed in the IPO prospectus 
One, if issue is backed by venture capitalists and zero 
otherwise 
One, if Big4 audit firm and zero if otherwise 
Std Deviation of stock returns for the first year of trading 
defined as trading day +6 to trading day 260 relative to 
IPO date. 
Shares sold by selling shareholderslTotal shares sold in 
the IPO 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the primary results of the tests conducted to attempt to 
answer the primary research question, that of establishing whether new 
issues on the AltX are underpriced. This chapter will also discuss the findings 
of the tests conducted through replication of the methodology utilized by 
Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006), in order to address the secondary 
research question, examining whether firms benefit from increased disclosure 
evidenced by reduced underpricing. For the purpose of this study, disclosure 
was defined as firms making reference to specific use of proceeds within the 
prospectus. 
4.2 Findings and Analysis 
4.2.1 Underpricing 
With regards to establishing whether underpricing has occurred on the AltX, 
the study analysed a sample of 25 firms that listed on the AltX within the 
period commencing October 2003 to 31 March 2007. The method utilized to 
measure underpricing was by taking the last transaction price on the first day 
of trading divided by the issue price, minus one. 
The average underpricing for the sample was 33.21%., the maximum 
recorded underpricing percentage was 150%, with a total of 22 firms recorded 
as having been underpriced. One firm was recorded as overpriced, with the 
issue price recorded as having exceeded the last transaction price on the first 
day of trading by 6.67%.Two firms were recorded as being "on the money", 
recording no underpricing or overpricing. On the face of it, it appears that 
underpricing is evident on the AltX. 
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The present study included those factors considered applicable to AltX listed 
firms. The final selected factors were: 
Assets: 
Age: 
Book/Market 
%Retained 
Pre - IPO total assets 
Years from founding or incorporation, if founding date is 
unavailable, to IPO 
Pre IPO shareholder's equity / (Gross IPO Proceeds/(1 -
%Retained) 
% of voting common stock retained by pre - IPO 
shareholders 
The above variables were all standardized to remove the bias of scale. The 
present study utilized a forward step-wise linear regression, at the 95% 
confidence level, incorporating the above listed variables as independent 
variables. The Specificity variable was included alongside the above 
independent variables. The recorded underpricing was used as the dependent 
variables. 
The study also conducted a simple linear regression of underpricing and the 
Specificity variable. 
This section concludes the research process followed to establish whether 
disclosure mechanisms (specifically, use of proceeds disclosure) utilised 
within the respective prospectus of firms that listed on the AltX during the 
period of review do not reduce the extent of underpricing. 
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Table 1: Summary results (Underpricing) 
Total population 
Firms excluded 
Total results unavailable 
Total no. of fims in sample 
Total no. recorded underpriced 
Total no. recorded overpriced 
Total no. recorded no under/over pricing 
Average Underpricing 
MaX 
Min 
Median 
Std Deviation 
SUMMARY RESULTS 
41 
16 
o 
25 
22 
2 
33.21% 
150.00% 
-6.67% 
20.00% 
35.39% 
88% 
4% 
8% 
100% 
The above results are similar to the results of previous studies focused on the 
South African market, albeit comprising larger samples extracted from the 
JSE. Barlow and Sparks (1986) recorded a simple weighted mean 
underpricing of 32.1 %. More recently, Brown (1995) recorded an average 
underpricing of 30.64%. The study conducted by Brown (1995) contained a 
sample of 107 newly listed firms to the JSE during the period 1983-1995. 
Further comparison of the present study to the study conducted by Barlow 
and Sparks (1986) was conducted, comparing the mean underpricing and 
standard deviation of the Development Capital Market (DCM) group of shares 
as compiled by Barlow and Sparks and the present Altx study. 
Comparing the findings indicates that the present-day Altx carries a lesser 
underpricing premium and standard deviation than the DCM in 1986. Further 
research could be conducted to ascertain the salient features that could be 
used to better understand the differences between the DCM and Altx, given 
the results tabulated below: 
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Comparison of Barlow and Sparks (1986) findings to the present study 
Sector Mean Premium Std Deviation No. of shares 
DCM (1986) 54.9% 45.1% 14 
AltX (200617) 33.21% 35.39% 25 
Similar reasoning was applied to the present study, as implied by Barlow and 
Sparks, in that the AltX, as with the DCM, should represent elevated risk 
profiles in comparison to the larger JSE sectors, given the shorter profit 
history of the majority of shares on the AltX. 
Although the above-mentioned alternate studies infer their results from a 
larger sample size and longer period of analysis, this does not preclude the 
evidence of underpricing on the AltX. 
As further analysis and comparison between the two studies, a test of 
significance of unequal variances was undertaken. The null hypothesis in this 
instance was that the variances were the same; the t-statistic figure calculated 
was 1.663. 
Based on a 95% confidence level, the null hypothesis was rejected, 
confirming the difference in variance between the two groups. 
These findings indicate that the average level of underpricing has decreased, 
possibly suggestive of a more efficient market mechanism at work with 
respect to the AltX in comparison to the DCM. In addition, the level of analysis 
and scrutiny applied to potential listings on the AltX, by the AltX Advisory 
Board is more thorough, when compared to the conditions for listing on the 
DCM. This provides greater confidence to the investment community of the 
quality of listings; evidenced the by the reduced level of underpricing on the 
AltX. 
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From Figure 1, it can be seen that approximately 50% of the shares listed on 
the AltX were offered to the public at a discount of up to, but not exceeding 
25%. Approximately 20% of the newly issued shares were listed at a discount 
of up to, but not exceeding 50%, four firms with a discount of up to, but not 
exceeding 75%. Only one firm was recorded with underpricing of greater than 
100%. 
Figure 1 
Distribution - Extent of underpricing 
Frequency 
25% 13 
50% 5 
75% 4 
100% 
More 
Distribution - Extent of underpricing 
14 
12 
I/) 10 
E 
L- 8 ~ 
.... 
0 6 0 
z 
4 
2 
0 
25% 50% 75% 100% 
Underpricing rv10re 
Further analysis into underpricing was conducted, with the intention of 
analysing the extent of underpricing during specific periods. The sample was 
segmented according to time, splitting the listings into one year periods, with 
the final period being six months: 
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1 October 2003 - 30 September 2004 (12 months) 
1 October 2004 - 30 September 2005 (12 months) 
1 October 2005 - 30 September 2006 (12 months) 
1 October 2006 - 31 March 2007 (6 months) 
The average underpricing of the selected group of companies which listed 
within the specific year was calculated, the results were as follows: 
Table 2: 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to time period 
October 2003 - 30 Se~temebr 2004 Listing Under~ricing Avg 
1 Simeka BSG Ltd 20-Aug-04 16.00% I .16.00% 
October 2004 - 30 Se~tember 2005 
1 Arch Equity Ltd 10-Dec-04 10.56% 
2 Alliance Data Corporation Ltd 30-Mar-05 52.00% 
3 Chrometco Ltd 12-Aug-05 3.20% 
4 Enaleni 10-Jun-05 20.00% 
5 Wescoal Holdings Ltd 20-Jul-05 10.00% 
6 WeliCo Health 22-Sep-05 50.00% 
I 24.2~';, 
October 2005 - 30 Se~tember 2006 
1 Acc-Ross Holdings Ltd 16-Feb-06 10.00% 
2 WG Weame Ltd 21-Feb-06 71.00% 
3 Esor 14-Mar-06 100.00% 
4 Sanyati Holdings Ltd 02-Jun-06 32.00% 
5 Taste Holdings Ltd 21-Jun-06 -6.67% 
6 Dialogue Group Holdings Ltd 19-5ep-06 21.00% 
7 Gooderson Leisure Corporation Ltd 26-Sep-06 0.00% 
I 32;48%. 
October 2006 - 31 March 2007 
1 Blue Financial Ser'Jices Ltd 12-0ct-06 45.00% 
2 Myriad Medical Holdings Ltd 17-0ct-06 11.76% 
3 Workforce Holdings Ltd 21-Nov-06 30.00% 
4 Celcom Group Ltd 22-Nov-06 10.00% 
5 SAFIC Holdings Ltd 23-Nov-06 0.00% 
6 African Cellular Towers 29-Nov-06 20.00% 
7 Top Fix Holdings 06-Dec-06 63.00% 
8 IFCA Technologies Ltd 08-Dec-06 16.00% 
9 Immuniti Holdings Ltd 12-Dec-06 150.00% 
10 Rare Holdings 23-Feb-07 42.50% 
11 Alert Steel 01-Mar-07 53.00% 
I 40.11% 
O~ 
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Barlow and Sparks (1986) premia over time 
Period Mean Premium No. of shares 
1972 -1974 10.2% 21 
1975 - 1977 24.4% 5 
1978 -1980 26.7% 12 
1981 -1983 22.3% 13 
1984 -1986 44.8% 54 
Population 32.1% 105 
AltX (2006-2007) premia over time 
Period Mean Premium No. of shares 
Oct 2003 - 30 Sept 2004 16.00% 1 
Oct 2004 - 30 Sept 2005 24.29% 6 
Oct 2005 - 30 Sept 2006 32.48% 7 
Oct 2006 - 31 Mar 2007 40.11% 11 
Population 33.21% 25 
The AltX carries the legacy of the failed Development and Venture Capital 
Boards of the JSE. It can be argued that this legacy remains an important 
factor in the perceptions held by local investors of these types of smaller 
listings. 
With the increase in the number of new listings on the AltX, Table 2 illustrates 
an observed increase in the recorded average underpricing for each specified 
time period. It cannot be inferred that the recorded increase in average 
underpricing per period is a function of the number of firms that list; however, 
the observed greater underpricing per period may serve as an indicator of 
greater ex ante uncertainty expressed of AltX listings from the market. 
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The results above, appear to support the "Winner's Curse Theory". The 
fundamental prediction of this theory is that as ex ante uncertainty increases 
the Winner's Curse problem is further intensified. Thus in order for more 
"uninformed" investors to be willing to submit purchase orders for shares, in 
which they perceive greater ex ante uncertainty, the firm looking to list must 
leave more "money on the table". 
An alternative explanation for the escalation in underpricing through the years 
may be that during the period of review, the AltX would be viewed to exhibit 
features of a "Hot Issue Market", where, the market perceives higher risk in 
the profile of the number of firms being introduced to the market. With regards 
to the AltX, it may be such that during the period October 2006 to the end of 
March 2007, the market may have viewed a higher proportion of firms that 
have listed, as firms of an elevated risk profile. 
The data suggests that during the period of review October 2003 - March 
2007, firms that listed on the AltX were underpriced. On further analysis of the 
extent of underpricing in view of the time period in which firms listed, the level 
of underpricing increased as new firms sought to list on the AltX. 
The following section will discuss the results of the second hypothesis, where 
it is tested whether it can be inferred that increased specificity of the use of 
proceeds reduced underpricing on the first day of listing. 
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4.2.2 Disclosure - Specific Use of Proceeds 
The results show only a handful of firms looking to list on the AltX, specify the 
intended use of proceeds, within the prospectus. Table 4 depicts, 36% of the 
sample were recorded as providing specific rand value figures, for key 
identified areas to which the proceeds of the IPO will be utilized towards. 
Thus, 64% of the sampled companies provide no specific details (i.e. were 
completely) vague. Only one firm recorded specificity of greater than 90%. 
Table 3 
Summary results (SPECIFICITY) 
SUMMARY RESULTS - SPECIFICITY 
Total population 
Finns excluded 
Total results unavailable 
Total no. of Finns in sample 
Total no. recorded (SPECIFICITY) 
Total no. recorded (NO SPECIFICITY) 
A\erage Specificity 
Max 
Min 
Median 
Std Deviation 
41 
16 
0 
25 
9 
16 
25.79% 
98.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
37.11% 
36% 
64% 
100% 
Of the nine firms with recorded specificity, the primary usage for funds raised 
from an initial public offering was expansion or acquisitions. The average 
specificity within the group of nine firms was 70.73%. The results indicate that 
the greatest proportion of funds raised from an IPO, amongst those firms that 
do provide disclosure, are used primarily toward the expansion or funding of 
growth prospects of the firm. The table below illustrates the use of proceeds 
as disclosed by these nine firms: 
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COMPANY ACC ROSS ALERT ACT CHROMETCO DIALOGUE GOODERSON MYRIAD TOPFIX WESCOAL 
TOTAL 
PROCEEDS (less 
listing costs) R 316,074,286 R 68,255,000 R 103,250,000 R 17,000,000 R 48,930,300 R 15,829,000 R 89,332,000 R 22,500,000 R 5,650,000 
DEBT R 116,500,000 R R R R R 
NON-DEBT R 199,574,286 'R 68,255,000 R 103,250,000 'R 15,500,000 R 48,930,300 'R 15,829,000 R 89,332,000 'R 22,500,000 R 5,650,000 
-EXPACQ R 144,200,000 R R R 5,000,000 R R 15,500,000 R 75,350,000 R 19,000,000 
-R&D R R R R R R R 
-SHRHLDS R R 50,000,000 R 55,750,000 R 16,000,000 R R R 
-AMPS R R R R R R R 
-WC R 35,374,286 R 18,255,000 R 47,500,000 R 3,500,000 R 32,930,300 R 329,000 R 13,982,000 R 3,500,000 
-OTHER R 20,000,000 R R R 7,000,000 R R R R 
% Specificity 89% 73% 54% 71% 33% 98% 84% 84% 
These results contrast to those of Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006) who 
find the major use of proceeds from their US-based sample was for 
deleveraging/reduction of debt. The average specificity for the entire sample 
of 25 firms was 25.79%. 
The limitation of sample size and general lack of disclosure, provided for weak 
statistically significant results. However, the simple linear regression between 
Underpricing and the Specificity variable returned an estimating equation that 
is consistent with the literature. From the estimating equation, it can be 
inferred if companies improve their disclosure, by increasing the specificity of 
use of proceeds by 1 %, this is associated with a 0.237% decrease in 
underpricing. However, taking into consideration the small sample size, this 
result is weak, statistically. Further research will need to be undertaken on this 
issue as the number of listings on the AltX increases over time. 
QO 
R 3,000,000 
R 
R 
R 
R 2,650,000 
R 
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Figure 2 
Simple Linear Regression 
[Underpricing against the Specificity Variable] 
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The above findings were not found to be statistically significant, however, did 
lend to the notion that issuers that disclose such details reduce the ex ante 
uncertainty about the true value of their shares Leone, Rock and Willenborg 
(2006). [Refer to Appendix 0 for Linear regression] 
Further analysis was conducted to the regression, for better insight of the 
clustering that emerged, where, clustering at the 0% Specificity, exhibited 
greater dispersion in underpricing. In contrast, clustering of those firms that 
did specify use of proceeds, did not exhibit dispersion of underpricing 
measures. 
A t-test of the two samples was performed assuming equal variances, with the 
null hypothesis assuming the means of the two selected groups being equal. 
The outcome of this test was such that the null hypothesis was rejected, 
confirming a difference in the means of the two selected groups. 
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t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
0% Specificity 0% < Spec ific ity 
Mean 0.39899375 0.213288889 
Variance 0.161312603 0.048415551 
Observations 16 9 
Pooled Variance 0.122044063 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 23 
t Stat 1.27578116 
P(T <=t) one-tail 0.107383735 
t Critical one-tail 1.713871517 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.21476747 
t Critical two-tail 2.068657599 
Due to the small sample size, the outlier variables have a disproportionate 
impact on the regression, also resulting in 0% Specificity readings varying 
right across the Underpricing spectrum. Thus the regression model of this 
small sample was considerably impacted by some of the extreme 
observations, for example: 
FIRM UNDERPRICING SPECIFICITY PROCEEDS 
FROM 
LISTING 
IMMUNITI 150% 0% R44 050 000 
ALLIANCE DATA 52% 0% R2 500 000 
CORP 
TASTE HOLDINGS -6.67% 0% R22 500 000 
Although, the general trend -line of the regression may lend some support to 
the notion that specific use of proceeds disclosure can increase the accuracy 
associated with share valuation, generally, the results indicate that disclosure 
of the uses of the proceeds and the level of specificity did not affect the level 
of underpricing. [See Appendix D] 
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4.2.3 Underpricing - Independent Variables 
Further analysis on how underpricing varied with selected independent 
variables was conducted. The variables were selected with due consideration 
of the content provided within each prospectus, and being able to collate 
sufficient data from such content. The variables were as follows: 
Pre-IPO Assets: Proxy (Size) 
Years since being incorporated: Proxy (Age) 
Book/Market: Proxy (Valuation uncertainty) 
% Retained Proxy (Ownership Retention) 
The tests were conducted in order to assess whether Altx listings adhered to 
predictions of theories posited on each of the above variables, and to 
ascertain the effect each variable should have on underpricing. 
The tests produced mixed results, offering no clear trend, on terms of 
illuminating the effect that the variable has on underpricing. This is possibly 
due to the limitations imposed on the tests by the small sample and 
timeframes. However, useful insights were drawn from the tests that 
contribute to the empirical literature on the topic of underpricing within South 
Africa and more specifically, on the Altx. Un
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Table 5 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to Pre-IPO Total Assets 
Company Company Assets Underpricing Average Underpricing 
Ace-Ross R 473,303,917 10.00% 
Blue R 283,812,000 45.00% 
Workforce R 282,187,000 30.00% 
Arch Equity R 194,650,000 10.56% 
Rare R 132,632,095 42.50% 27.61% 
Alert Steel R 131,884,953 53.00% 
Top Fix R 121,020,415 63.00% 
Sanyati R 96,699,000 32.00% 
Gooderson R 92,473,000 0.00% 
ACT R 86,993,179 20.00% 33.60% 
Safic R 82,535,000 0.00% 
WG Wearne R 70,748,698 71.00% 
~naleni R 59,334,096 ,. 20.00% 
Wescoal R 55,197,000 10.00% 
Celcom R 52,123,666 10.00% 22.20% 
IFCA R 46,463,152 16.00% 
Esor R 41,234,796 100.00% 
Alliance Data R 37,430,632 52.00% 
IMMUNITl R 34,129,326 150.00% 
Taste R 28,897,684 -6.67% 62.27% 
Dialogue Group R 17,028,000 21.00% 
Simeka R 11,665,000 16.00% 
WeliCo R 8,963,433 50.00% 
Chrometco R 3,127,627 3.20% 
Myriad R 72,000 11.76% 20.39% 
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Figure 3 
Simple Linear Regression 
[Underpricing against Pre - IPO Asset Variable] 
Scatterplot (Spreadsheet in MRxis Sv*2Sc) 
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The above data illustrates the large variation within the sample, with regards 
to the pre-IPO total asset-base. The sample of firms taken from the AltX, 
provide results somewhat inconsistent to applied logic. The observed average 
underpricing per "size" for the group of firms with the smallest pre-IPO asset 
base within the entire sample, also records the lowest average underpricing. 
This is indicative of other factors, other than "company size", that have an 
influence of investors' perception of valuation uncertainty of a particular 
company. 
The regression indicates there is no relationship between the size of the 
company and the level of underpricing. [See Appendix E.i] 
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The sample was proportioned on the basis of asset base, as a proxy for size. 
Theory posits that larger companies, on the basis of larger asset base should 
experience less underpricing than smaller firms. The size of the firm provides 
investors with a measure of the uncertainty or risk of the firm, the larger firs 
viewed to present less risk than the smaller firms. 
A comparison was undertaken between the present study on the AltX and the 
findings of Barlow and Sparks (1986). Although the present study features 
fewer firms per size grouping (5 firms per size grouping) compared to 21 firms 
per size grouping of Barlow and Sparks (1986); the findings are similar in both 
instances; that there is no clear trend illustrating that smaller companies, carry 
a greater risk premium, as evidenced by greater underpricing. 
Barlow and Sparks (1986) suggest a possible reason for contrary results to 
suggested theory, being that larger firms feature greater underpricing, not 
because they are of greater risk, but rather because they need to attract more 
capital. The authors posit that larger firms can better exercise the ability to 
offer more generous underpricing than smaller firms as they are confident in 
their ability to attract further capital. 
Barlow and Sparks (1986): Population was divided into quintiles based 
on market capitalizations (as a proxy for size) and findings are shown 
below: 
Quintile Mean Premium No. of shares 
1 st (largest) 37.1% 21 
2nd 33.6% 21 
3rd 38.4% 21 
4th 18.8% 21 
5th 32.4% 21 
Population 32.10% 105 
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AltX (2006/7): Population was divided into quintiles based on Pre-IPO 
total asset base (as a proxy for size) and findings are shown below: 
Quintile Mean Premium No. of shares 
1 SI (largest) 27.61% 5 
2na 33.60% 5 
3ra 22.20% 5 
4th 62.27% 5 
5tn 20.39% 5 
Population 33.21% 25 
Valuation uncertainty 
In the study by Leone Rock and Willenborg (2006), the authors utilize the 
book-to-market ratio as a proxy for valuation uncertainty. This study defines 
book-to-market as: 
Pre-IPO shareholders equity + (Gross IPO proceeds + (1 - %Retained)) 
Leone Rock and Willenborg (2006) make use of an earlier study by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), which records that during the 1980's, within the United 
States, the average first-day return on IPO's was 7%. The average first-day 
return doubled to almost 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% 
during the internet bubble years of 1999-2000. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) contend that if the proportion of IPO's that 
represent risky stocks increases, the average underpricing should increase. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) posit as valuations increase, so to does the 
associated valuation uncertainty. 
A similar approach to that utilized by Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006) was 
applied to the present study, in regressing the book-to-market variable against 
underpricing, in order to observe whether the contentions of Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), hold true for the AltX. 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to Book-to-Market 
Valuation 
Company Book to Market Underpricing Average Underpricing 
Alliance Data 3.86 52.00% 
Arch Equity 3.75 10.56% 
Blue 2.06 45.00% 
Safic 1.69 0.00% 
Workforce 0.95 30.00% 27.51% 
IFCA 0.83 16.00% 
Gooderson 0.69 0.00% 
Top Fix 0.40 63.00% 
Sanyati 0.34 32.00% 
Wescoal 0.34 10.00% 24.20% 
Esor 0.32 100.00% 
Rare 0.31 42.50% 
ACT 0.24 20.00% 
Acc-Ross 0.22 10.00% 
Alert Steel 0.17 53.00% 45.10% 
Enaleni 0.14 20.00% 
Celcom 0.11 10.00% 
Taste 0.04 
,. 
-6.67% 
Dialogue Group 0.02 21.00% 
Chrometco 0.02 3.20% 9.51% 
Well Co 0.01 50.00% 
Myriad 0.00 11.76% 
WG Wearne 0.00 71.00% 
IMMUNITI -0.03 150.00% 
IFCA -0.08 16.00% 59.75% 
("., 
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Figure 4 
Simple Linear Regression 
[Underpricing against Book - Market Variable] 
Scatterplot (Spreadsheet in MRxis 5v*25c) 
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The findings of the present study provide weak support for the above theory. If 
the ratio is above 1 then the share is undervalued; if it is less than 1, the share 
is overvalued. The logic to this measurement is such that where an issue 
price is not supported by the fundamental value of the company (in this 
instance the net asset value prior to listing), the risk for the investor increases. 
There is marked underpricing for those firms where the book-to-market ratios 
are closer to zero; implying that these shares are closer to being overpriced 
relative to their book value of equity and are therefore likely to exhibit greater 
underpricing. Interestingly, the one firm with the highest recorded underpricing 
within the entire sample, also exhibits a negative book-to-market valuation; 
recording negative pre-IPO shareholder's equity. 
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Barlow and Sparks (1986) conducted a similar study, testing the hypothesis 
that underpricing is positively related to the ratio of the issue price to the net 
asset value. This hypothesis implies that the shares which are overpriced 
relative to their disclosed net asset values (nav) are likely to exhibit greater 
underpricing than those not overpriced to the same extent. Therefore, 
because underpricing and risk are positively related and it is expected that as 
the ratio of the issue price to net asset value increases, the underpricing will 
increase Barlow and Sparks (1986). 
The following table summarizes the results obtained by Barlow and 
Sparks (1986): 
Ratio of issue price to Mean Premium No. of shares 
NAV 
,<1.0 18.3% 17 
>1.0 but <1.25 26.9% 29 
>1.25 but <2.0 30.2% 28 
>2.0 47.7% 30 
Population 32.4% 104 
The following table summarizes the results obtained from the present 
study of the AltX (2006/7): 
Ratio of issue price to Mean Premium No. of shares 
NAV: 
<1.0 39.17% 9 
>1.0 but <1.25 10.88% 2 
>1.25 but <2.0 46.93% 7 
>2.0 18.22% 7 
Population 33.21% 25 
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The results derived from the Altx were incongruent to those achieved by 
Barlow and Sparks (1986). The implication of these findings is such that, at 
present, the Altx provides results that do not support the logic that shares 
which are overpriced relative to their net asset values are likely to exhibit 
greater underpricing. However, as more firms list on the Altx, further research 
can be conducted, incorporating larger samples, where the results are not as 
adversely impacted by single outliers, as is the case with the present study. 
Ownership Retention 
The ownership variable is utilised as a proxy for gauging the continued 
confidence that existing shareholders have in that particular firm. Theory 
suggests less ownership by existing shareholders, post-IPO, serves as an 
indicator of elevated risk for investors in that particular company. 
An important consideration taken, when analyzing this particular variable, in 
the context of the AltX, is that a key motivation expressed by all firms looking 
to list on the AltX, is the ability for the listing to enable empowerment, through 
the transfer of shareholding within the company to an empowerment partner. 
In addition to this, closely held companies, would look to the listing to allow for 
a broader shareholding within the firm, as well as to allow for greater liquidity 
in the shares traded. Un
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Figure 5 
Simple Linear Regression 
[Underpricing against Ownership Retention 
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Retained Ownership 
The observed results illustrate that there is no relationship between ownership 
retention and the level of underpricing as indicated by the scattergraph, and 
the results of the regression. 
1 "1 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table 7 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to Ownership Retention 
% Retained Underpricing Average Underpricing 
90.00% 16.00% 
89.40% 30.00% 
88.87% 10.56% 
88.76% 10.00% 
86.49% 63.00% 25.91% 
81.76% 45.00% 
79.17% 0.00% 
71.90% 20.00% 
71.78% 52.00% 
68.40% 150.00% 53.40% 
68.00% 53.00% 
64.96% 21.00% 
63.00% 16.00% 
58.20% 42.50% 
55.40% 100.00% 46.50% 
54.59% 10.00% 
54.00% 20.00% 
53.80% 3.20% 
48.23% 32.00% 
44.96% 10.00% 15.04% 
42.20% -6.67% 
39.70% 71.00% 
26.10% 11.76% 
25.27% 0.00% 
22.34% 50.00% 25.22% 
This section concludes the findings and analysis section related to the second 
hypothesis. The limited sample size inhibited finding statistically significant 
results, the above data motivates for further research within this area. The 
above findings highlight the fact that disclosure policy, with a focus on specific 
use of proceeds, offers only limited amount of explanation for underpricing. As 
indicated by Welker (1995), it is unique to the area of research in underpricing 
and disclosure theory, that there is a sUbstantial proportion of information that 
is not captured within the prospectus that can affect the level of underpricing. 
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Currently, the listing requirements of the AltX do not provide clear instructions 
with regards to the level of content that companies must provide with regards 
to the use of proceeds. The AltX listing requirements give mention only to 
ensuring that the information provided is accurate, complete and not 
misleading or false. As a result, this discretion afforded to firms allows for the 
variability in the extent of detail provided in the prospectus, as witnessed 
within the current study. 
As previously cited in research conducted by Ljungqvist (2006), in the 
absence of standardized rules regarding disclosure, it remains unclear 
whether variation in disclosure (e.g. Specificity) reflects underlying differences 
in uncertainty or merely in the drafting of the prospectus. 
At this point in time, listing firms on the AltX, that offer specific information (the 
level of specificity) does not appear to affect the level of underpricing. The 
study does highlight limited variation amongst firms in terms of the use of 
proceeds, the majority using funds raised from listing for expansion and 
acquisition purposes. This contrasts to the results of Leone, Rock and 
Willenborg (2006), that recorded the majority of firms in the United States 
utilized proceeds raised from listing, towards settling of debt. 
The present research study on the AltX fails to produce statistically significant 
results when measuring a relationship between underpricing and independent 
variables, size, valuation uncertainty and ownership retention. The present 
findings can however serve as preliminary findings supporting for future 
research on new issuances on the AltX, as more firms list on the AltX. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
This research presents a maiden attempt at empirically testing the level of 
underpricing and the extent of disclosure within the listing prospectus. The 
primary hypothesis looked to establish whether underpricing had occurred on 
the AltX during a specific period of review, being 27 October 2007 to 31 
March 2007. 
The second aspect of the research was to determine whether it is possible to 
infer that there is a relationship between increased disclosures and reduced 
underpricing. Use of proceeds disclosure within the prospectus was utilized as 
a proxy for disclosure, and measured against the recorded underpricing of the 
selected sample of shares. Additional tests were also conducted to evaluate 
for possible relationships between the level of underpricing and independent 
variables size, valuation uncertainty and ownership retention. 
Prior South African as well as international research shows evidence of 
underpricing of new issuances on the first day of trade. The present study 
provides similar findings to prior research, recording underpricing of new 
share issuances to the AltX. 
The methodology followed within this study attempted to follow on that of 
Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2006), in attempting to test whether it is evident 
that increased disclosure through use of proceeds results in reduced 
underpricing of shares. 
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The study attempted to test the relationship between the extent of 
underpricing and the following variables: pre-listing total assets, book-market 
value, retained ownership and specificity. The results of the regression 
analysis failed to provide statistically significant results. 
Limited sample size did impact the study; however drafting of the 
prospectuses may have been of greater importance, in the sense that firms 
that failed to indicate use of funds, resulted in a specificity measure of zero. 
The results are interesting as a lack of disclosure on the uses of the proceeds 
did not affect the level of underpricing. However, only nine out of twenty-five 
firms included within this study, recorded a measure of specificity. Therefore 
the drafting of the prospectus may have had a preemptive impact on the 
study, in that drafting may have had a greater impact on the study than the 
actual firm decision regarding the extent of disclosure. 
5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Designated Advisors perform a critical function during the pre listing process; 
tasked with ensuring that the firms that are brought before the AltX listing 
committee, are firms of suitable quality. An interesting area for future research 
may look into rating and ranking Designated Advisors. In this way, it is 
possible to conduct similar studies to international researchers, whereby the 
underwriter or promoters are benchmarked according a predetermined 
criterion. In addition to this, the Designated Advisors can therefore be 
compared on similar basis to Investment Banks, adjudging the high quality 
Designated Advisors from those of lesser quality or experience. This data can 
therefore be utilized to assess whether a relationship exists between the 
extent of underpricing and the selected Designated Advisor. A similar 
approach could also be followed for assessing the auditing and legal firms 
involved in the listing process of the AltX. 
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The present study limits the number of firms included within the study, in 
accordance to specific limitations. Future research could look at mitigating 
some of the exclusionary factors highlighted in (Section 3.2.1), in order to 
accommodate for a larger sample size. Firms gave reference to funds being 
used towards the "general" operations of the company as well as often gave 
reference to raising funds in order to have access to opportunities when they 
arrive. In both instances, within this study, references to some of these 
activities we treated as "vague" disclosure and therefore not included as a 
valid disclosure. 
Disclosure as a topic is very wide-ranging, and allows for other aspects of 
disclosure being explored, and measured against underpricing. Over-time, an 
interesting area of research would be to measure the variability in specificity 
of the various companies that on the Altx. The deterioration or improvement 
in the level of specificity can therefore be compared to the level of 
underpricing of the matching firms, in order to establish whether specificity 
can explain the changes in observed underpricing over time. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
List of companies 27 October 2003 - 31 March 2007 
COMPANY SHARE CODE LISTING DATE 
1 Acc-Ross Holdings Ltd ACC 16-Feb-06 
2 African Dawn Capital Ltd ADW 05-May-04 
3 All Joy Foods Ltd ALJ 08--.1ul-04 
4 Alliance Data Corporation Ltd ACD 30-Mar-05 
5 Arch Equity 10-Dec-04 
6 Beige Holdings Ltd BEG 29--.1an-04 
7 Blue Financial Services Ltd BFS 12-Oct-06 
8 Chrometco Limited CMO 12-Aug-05 
9 DataPro Group Ltd DTP 18-Oct-04 
10 Dialogue Group Holdings Ltd DLG 19-5ep-06 
11 Enaleni ENL 10--.lun-05 
12 Esor Ltd ESR 14-Mar-06 
13 Gooderson Leisure Corporation Ltd GDN 26-Sep-06 
14 Insurance Outsourcing 29--.1an-04 
15 IPSA Group PLC IPS 19-Oct-06 
16 MilkworxLtd MKX 27-Sep-04 
17 Myriad Medical Holdings Ltd MYD 17-Oct-06 
18 Oasis Crescent Property Fund OAS 23-Nov-05 
19 OneLogix Group Ltd OLG 27-May-04 
20 Sanyati Holdings Ltd SAN 02--.1un-06 
21 Simeka BSG Ltd SBG 20-Aug-04 
22 Spectrum Shipping Ltd SUM 27--.1un-06 
23 Taste Holdings Ltd TAS 21--.1un-06 
24 WG Wearne Ltd WEA 21-Feb-06 
25 Wellco Health Ltd WLL 22-Sep-05 
26 Wescoal Holdings Ltd WSL 20--.lul-05 
27 Yomhlaba Resources Ltd (SUSPENDED) YBA 29-Nov-04 
28 Zaptronix Ltd ZPT 27--.1un-06 
29 Alert Steel Holdings Ltd AET 01-Mar-07 
30 African Cellular Towers Ltd ATR 29-Nov-06 
31 Celcom Group Ltd CEL 22-Nov-06 
32 IFCA Technologies Ltd IFC 08-Dec-06 
33 Immuniti Holdings Ltd IMU 12-Dec-06 
34 RareHoldings RAR 23-Feb-07 
35 SAB& T Ubuntu Holdings Ltd SUL 30-Nov-06 
36 SAFIC Holdings Ltd SIC 23-Nov-06 
37 Telemasters Holdings L m TLM 12-Mar-07 
38 Top Fix Holdings Ltd TFX 06-Dec-06 
39 Workforce Holdings Ltd WKF 21-Nov-06 
40 MoneyWeb Holdings Ltd MNY 08-Nov-06 
41 SilverBridge Holdings Ltd SVB 27-Nov-06 
REASON FOR EXCLUSION 
Transfer from the JSE Mainboard 
Transfer from the JSE Mainboard 
Transfer from the JSE Mainboard 
Reverse Listing 
Transfer from the JSE Mainboard 
Trading already on AIM 
Reverse Listing 
Unit Offering 
Transfer from the JSE Mainboard 
Reverse Listing 
Reverse Listing 
Reverse Listing 
Introduction 
Introductiom 
Transfer from the JSE Mainboard 
Reverse Listin 
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Appendix 8 
Sample of companies - Hypothesis 1 and 2 
Underpricing Specificity Proceeds Assets Age BooklMarket%Retained 
1 Acc-Ross 10.00% 88.81% R 326,000,000 R 473,303,917 6 yrs 0.22 54.59% 
2 Alert Steel 53.00% 73.00% R 70,000,000 R 131,884,953 4 years 0.17 68.00% 
3 ACT 20.00% 54.00% R 105,750,000 R 86,993,179 7 yrs 0.24 54.00% 
4 Alliance Data 52.00% 0.00% R 2,500,000 R 37,430,632 8 yrs 3.86 71.78% 
5 Arch Equity 10.56% 0.00% R 36,000,000 R 194,650,000 1 yr 3.75 88.87% 
6 Blue 45.00% 0.00% R 20,000,000 R 283,812,000 10 yrs 2.06 81.76% 
7 Celcom 10.00% 0.00% R 23,000,000 R 52,123,666 8 yrs 0.11 88.76% 
8 Chrometco 3.20% 77.00% R 22,000,000 R 3,127,627 3 yrs 0.02 53.80% 
9 Dialogue Group 21.00% 33.00% R 50,999,300 R 17,028,000 11 yrs 0.02 64.96% 
10 Enaleni 20.00% 0.00% R 10,000,000 R 59,334,096 3 yrs 0.14 71.90% 
11 Esor 100.00% 0.00% R 20,000,000 R 41,234,796 12 yrs 0.32 55.40% 
12 Gooderson 0.00% 97.92% R 17,000,000 R 92,473,000 34 yrs 0.69 79.17% 
13 IFCA 16.00% 0.00% R 5,000,000 R 46,463,152 1 yr 0.83 90.00% 
14 IMMUNITI 150.00% 0.00% R 44,050,000 R 34,129,326 2 yrs -0.03 68.40% 
15 Myriad 11.76% 84.00% R 95,000,000 R 72,000 1 yr 0.00 26.10% 
16 Rare 42.50% 0.00% R 37,500,000 R 132,632,095 5 yrs 0.31 58.20% 
17 Safic 0.00% 0.00% R 15,000,000 R 82,535,000 2 yrs 1.69 25.27% 
18 Sanyati 32.00% 0.00% R 35,000,000 R 96,699,000 18 yrs 0.34 48.23% 
19 Simeka 16.00% 0.00% R 5,000,000 R 11,665,000 1 yr -0.08 63.00% 
20 Taste -6.67% 0.00% R 22,500,000 R 28,897,684 6 yrs 0.04 42.20% 
21 Top Fix 63.00% 84.00% R 25,000,000 R 121,020,415 1 yr 0.40 86.49% 
22 WG Wearne 71.00% 0.00% R 25,000,000 R 70,748,698 12 yrs 0.00 39.70% 
23 WeliCo 50.00% 0.00% R 9,000,000 R 8,963,433 1 yr 0.01 22.34% 
24 Wescoal 10.00% 53.00% R 7,000,000 R 55,197,000 1 yr 0.34 44.96% 
25 Workforce 30.00% 0.00% R 24,000,000 R 282,187,000 1 yr 0.95 89.40% 
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Appendix C 
Categorization use of proceeds disclosure and calculating the 
"Specificity" variable 
• The definitions for the categorization that constituted the variable 
"Specificity" are listed below. 
• The listing prospectus would need to contain rand value specifications 
for the use of proceeds from listing that would then be classified under 
one of the categories below. The two broad categories used were Debt 
and non-Debt usage. 
• The non-Debt categorization of "Working Capital" was defined as a 
vague description, which would not be considered as a specification. 
• Other commonly used "uses of proceeds" references within South 
African prospectuses were as follows: 
o Allow the company have capital available for future strategic 
acquisitions 
Specificity - Non Debt 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
purposes other than debt repayment. 
Sub-categories of Specificity - Non Debt 
Specificity - ExpAcq 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
expansion or acquisitions. 
Specificity - R&D 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
R&D or product development. 
Specificity - Shrhlds 
Fraction of company's IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
distribution to pre - IPO shareholders. 
Specificity - AMPS 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
advertising, marketing, promotion or sales. 
Specificity - we 
Fraction of company IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for 
particular working capital uses. 
Specificity - Other 
Fraction of IPO proceeds for which amounts are designated for other uses. 
Example 1: Esor Ltd (14/03/2006) Specificity = 0.0% 
The purpose of the placement and listing are to: 
raise capital and to have the flexibility of listed shares to allow the 
company to take advantage of potential acquisition opportunities. 
- A listing on the AltX improves the company's ability to raise capital for 
strategic acquisitions. 
Example 2: Wescoal Holdings Ltd (20/07/2005) Specificity = 53.10% 
[Specificity - ExpAcq 53. 10%] 
The purpose of the placement and listing are to: 
- An amount of R7 000 000, before share issue and listing expenses will be 
raised by the issue of shares for cash to private individuals, corporations 
and institutions. The proceeds will be utilized for feasibility studies, 
exploration activities and acquisition of mining equipment. 
It is anticipated that a further R3 000 000 will be utilized from the private 
placement funds on the moving and upgrading of the washing plant. 
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Example 3: Gooderson Leisure Corp Ltd (26/09/2006) Specificity = 97.92% 
[Specificity - ExpAcq 97.92%] 
The purpose of the placement and listing are to: 
It is intended that an amount of R17 000 000, before share issue and 
listing expenses, will be raised by the issue of shares for cash to private 
individuals, corporations and institutions. The proceeds will be utilized for 
capital expenditure and strategic acquisitions. 
Details of material proposed acquisitions by Gooderson are set out below: 
R 13 000 000 Natal Spa 
R2 500 000 land situated on remainder of Erf 167, Mtunzini 
The acquisitions will be paid in cash from funds raised through the Private 
Placement. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
• 
" 0 
"  c 
• 
" 
" 0 
Appendix D 
Linear Regression : Specificity variable and Underpricing 
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Step-wise Regression : Specificity variable and Underpricing 
R~gresslOn Summary lor [)., p ~r>d ~ nt Variable: Ur>derprlcing 
R= .23916541 R'= 03361664 Adjusted R'= 00030906 
F(1.22)-1 0037 p< .3B269 SId Error of estimate .. J5J8J 
""" 
Sld.Err, e SId Err, 1(22) p-Iev~ 
N-25 01 Bela 
"'" Intercept 
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0.332140 0_070766 ~6934~ 000011 I&: ",Iicit --
-{I.289227 0211899 -{I. l02353 0_074917 -1 .366220.18587 
BooI<JMarket -O. t5343€ 0.211699 ..(1,054298 0,074917 ..(1.72479 0.47622 
The results from the regression were not statically significant. The small 
sample size compromised the strength of the predictive power of the model 
The model did however identify Specificity and Book/market independent 
variables, as the stronger variables within the model 
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Appendix E 
Regression Independent variables and Underpricing 
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E.ii Underpricing and Book-Market 
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Appendix F 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
0% Specificity 0% <Specificity 
Mean 0.39899375 0.213288889 
Variance 0.161312603 0.048415551 
Observations 16 9 
Pooled Variance 0.122044063 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 23 
t Stat 1.27578116 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.107383735 
t Critical one-tail 1.713871517 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.21476747 
t Critical two-tail 2.068657599 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Summary results - Underpricing 
Total population 
Firms excluded 
Total results unavailable 
Total no. of fims in sample 
Total no. recorded underpriced 
Total no. recorded overpriced 
Total no. recorded no underlover pricing 
Average Underpricing 
MaX 
Min 
Median 
Std Deviation 
SUMMARY RESULTS 
41 
16 
o 
25 
22 
2 
33.21% 
150.00% 
-6.67% 
20.00% 
35.39% 
88% 
4% 
8% 
100% 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to time period 
October 2003 - 30 Se~temebr 2004 Listing Under~ricing Avg 
1 Simeka BSG Ltd 20-Aug-04 16.00% I .. . 16. 0£)l1l6fij~0j 
October 2004 - 30 Se~tember 2005 
1 Arch Equity Ltd 10-Dec-04 10.56% 
2 Alliance Data Corporation Ltd 30-Mar-05 52.00% 
3 Chrometco Ltd 12-Aug-05 3.20% 
4 Enaleni 10-Jun-05 20.00% 
5 Wescoal Holdings Ltd 20-Jul-05 10.00% 
6 Well Co Health 22-Sep-05 50.00% 
1··<+i}~i;29%· 
October 2005 - 30 Se~tember 2006 
1 Acc-Ross Holdings Ltd 16-Feb-06 10.00% 
2 WG Weame Ltd 21-Feb-06 71.00% 
3 Esor 14-Mar-06 100.00% 
4 Sanyati Holdings Ltd 02-Jun-06 32.00% 
5 Taste Holdings Ltd 21-Jun-06 -6.67% 
6 Dialogue Group Holdings Ltd 19-5ep-06 21.00% 
7 Gooderson Leisure Corporation Ltd 26-Sep-06 0.00% 
I i;$2i~% 
October 2006 - 31 March 2007 
1 Blue Financial Ser\'ices Ltd 12-0ct-06 45.00% 
2 Myriad Medical Holdings Ltd 17-0ct-06 11.76% 
3 Workforce Holdings Ltd 21-Nov-06 30.00% 
4 Celcom Group Ltd 22-Nov-06 10.00% 
5 SAFIC Holdings Ltd 23-Nov-06 0.00% 
6 African Cellular Towers 29-Nov-06 20.00% 
7 Top Fix Holdings 06-Dec-06 63.00% 
8 IFCA Technologies Ltd 08-Dec-06 16.00% 
9 Immuniti Holdings Ltd 12-Dec-06 150.00% 
10 Rare Holdings 23-Feb-07 42.50% 
11 Alert Steel 01-Mar-07 53.00% 
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Table 3 
Summary results (SPECIFICITY) 
SUMMARY RESULTS - SPECIFICITY 
Total population 
Firms excluded 
Total results unavailable 
Total no. of firms in sample 
Total no. recorded (SPECIFICllY) 
Total no. recorded (NO SPECIFICllY) 
A-.erage Specificity 
Max 
Min 
Median 
Std De"';ation 
Table 4 
41 
16 
o 
25 
9 36% 
16 64% 
100% 
25.79% 
98.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
37.11% 
Summary results [STEPWISE REGRESSION] 
N = 25 Beta Std Error B 
of Beta 
Intercept 0.332140 
Specificity -0.289227 0.211699 -0.102353 
Book/market -0.153436 0.211699 -0.054299 
Std t(22) p-Ievel 
Error of 
B 
0.070766 4.69347 0.000111 
0.074917 -1.36622 0.185675 
0.074917 -0.72479 0.476222 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to Pre-IPO Total Assets 
Company Company Assets Underpricing Average Underpricing 
Acc-Ross R 473,303,917 10.00% 
Blue R 283,812,000 45.00% 
Workforce R 282,187,000 30.00% 
Arch Equity R 194,650,000 10.56% 
Rare R 132,632,095 42.50% 27.61% 
Alert Steel R 131,884,953 53.00% 
Top Fix R 121,020,415 63.00% 
Sanyati R 96,699,000 32.00% 
Gooderson R 92,473,000 0.00% 
ACT R 86,993,179 20.00% 33.60% 
Safic R 82,535,000 0.00% 
WG Wearne R 70,748,698 71.00% 
'Enaleni R 59,334,096 ,. 20.00% 
Wescoal R 55,197,000 10.00% 
Celcom R 52,123,666 10.00% 22.20% 
IFCA R 46,463,152 16.00% 
Esor R 41,234,796 100.00% 
Alliance Data R 37,430,632 52.00% 
IMMUNIll R 34,129,326 150.00% 
Taste R 28,897,684 -6.67% 62.27% 
Dialogue Group R 17,028,000 21.00% 
Simeka R 11,665,000 16.00% 
WeilCo R 8,963,433 50.00% 
Chrometco R 3,127,627 3.20% 
Myriad R 72,000 11.76% 20.39% 
''''"7 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to Book-to-Market 
Valuation 
% Retained Underpricing Average Underpricing 
90.00% 16.00% 
89.40% 30.00% 
88.87% 10.56% 
88.76% 10.00% 
86.49% 63.00% 25.91% 
81.76% 45.00% 
79.17% 0.00% 
71.90% 20.00% 
71.78% 52.00% 
68.40% 150.00% 53.40% 
68.00% 53.00% 
64.96% 21.00% 
63.00% 16.00% 
58.20% 42.50% 
55.40% 100.00% 46.50% 
54.59% 10.00% 
54.00% 20.00% 
53.80% 3.20% 
48.23% 32.00% 
44.96% 10.00% 15.04% 
42.20% -6.67% 
39.70% 71.00% 
26.10% 11.76% 
25.27% 0.00% 
22.34% 50.00% 25.22% 
1'"10 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Underpricing-Segmented according to Ownership Retention 
% Retained Underpricing Average Underpricing 
90.00% 16.00% 
89.40% 30.00% 
88.87% 10.56% 
88.76% 10.00% 
86.49% 63.00% 25.91% 
81.76% 45.00% 
79.17% 0.00% 
71.90% 20.00% 
71.78% 52.00% 
68.40% 150.00% 53.40% 
68.00% 53.00% 
64.96% 21.00% 
63.00% 16.00% 
58.20% 42.50% 
55.40% 100.00% 46.50% 
54.59% 10.00% 
54.00% 20.00% 
53.80% 3.20% 
48.23% 32.00% 
44.96% 10.00% 15.04% 
42.20% -6.67% 
39.70% 71.00% 
26.10% 11.76% 
25.27% 0.00% 
22.34% 50.00% 25.22% Un
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Distribution - Extent of underpricing 
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Figure 2 
Simple Linear Regression 
[Underpricing against the Specificity Variable] 
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Figure 3 
Simple Linear Regression 
[Underpricing against Pre -IPO Asset Variable] 
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Figure 4 
Simple linear Regression 
[Underpricing against Book - Market Variable] 
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Figure 5 
Simple Linear Regression 
{Underpricing against Ownership Retention 
1GO Ixn. 
'40.(Xn. 
'20.['Y ' 
·OO.l)J 1. 
, 
• 0 80. 00"~ 
• , , 
" GOJXn . 0 
• 0 , , 
, 
40.l)Y" 
, , 
2000r, , , , , , 
• 
, , 
0.00"', " , 
-20.001. L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1 a Wi(, 3a.OO" 5().OO".1, 7a ()I)"~ o/.l. OO"\ 
20(]()1; ~o .OO',(, 60.00% ~o . ao'.;. '00 .00',(, 
Rot.in~d ONner<nip 
, " 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
